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Introduction 
Until recently there has been an implicit presumption of the metaphoric character of terms 
such as ‘message’, ‘meaning’, ‘code’, ‘sign’, and the like, if applied to organisms other 
than humans and the possibility of their reduction to interactions describable effectively 
in terms of physics and chemistry. However, as reductionist theories have shown little or 
no promise, biosemiotics tries to offer a new dialogue between life sciences and 
humanities and takes upon itself the task of formulating “an explicit biological theory 
taking these recurrent semiotic metaphors at face value and discussing them as real 
scientific problems” (Emmeche, Kull, Stjernfelt 2002: 9). The shift of the semiotic 
threshold, i.e. the boundary between the non-semiotic area and semiotic area, opens up a 
possibility to apply such attributes as ‘subjectivity’ and ‘agency’, which have been 
elaborated in the context of humanities, to other non-human living beings. Thus, for 
example, contemporary biosemiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer takes the conception of 
subjectivity as correspondent to the “criterion distinguishing living system from non-
living systems: the capacity for selective (i.e., active) incorporation of the present into the 
future” (Hoffmeyer 1992:103). Against this background, the concept of self and related 
notions such as ‘subjectivity’, ‘agency’, and ‘subject’ have acquired a special significance 
in the biosemiotic discourse on life.  
The first attempts to introduce the concept of subjectivity in a biological discourse 
were associated with the need to overcome the inadequacy of objectivism and externalism 
inherent to the traditional paradigm of life sciences (Uexküll 1982 [1940], 1992 [1934]; 
Rothschild 1962, 2000). Recently, the majority of references to subjectivity and self have 
been made in policy texts accentuating the specificity of biosemiotic discourse and 
biosemiotic approach to life (Sebeok 1991; Uexküll 1995; Hoffmeyer 1996, 1997a, 
1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 2001, 2006, 2012; Emmeche et al. 2002; Stjernfelt 2002; Kull et 
al. 2009). One of the most remarkable characteristics of biosemiotic understanding of life 
consists in the introduction and justification of causality different from the mechanistic 
causality, which bears on the formulation of an explicit biosemiotic concept of self. The 
issue of causality arises not only with respect to how biosemiotics grounds its own 
position as a scientific endeavour, but also with the view of treatment of the self as a fact 
of biological and semiotic organization and a causally efficacious locus of meaning 
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making. Thus Hoffmeyer stipulates for the vindication of final cause, while Deely argues 
for the objective causality being most suitable to account for the action of signs 
(Hoffmeyer 2014, Deely 2001). For Barbieri, the interpretive activity of complex living 
systems might be grounded by formal and final causality. ‘Formal’ is meant to designate 
the downward causation from the structure of the organism to smallest units such as 
individual molecules. This downward causation resides in constraining their action and 
imparting a functional meaning to them in relation to the whole metabolism. On the other 
hand, ‘final causation’ points to the tendency to acquire habits and to produce 
interpretants about future events (Barbieri 2008). Another important constituent of 
biosemiotic discourse, which is partially connected to the grounding of new causality and 
in connection with which the concept of self and related terms come to the forefront, is 
the status of ideal objects. For Stjernfelt, biosemiotics proceeds from the real existence of 
a specific kind of ideal objects, i.e. the possibilities. He subsumes under this title a fitness 
space of all possible genomes, the virtuality in nature, tendencies in the development and 
evolution, and the possibility for final causes to prioritize one tendency over another 
(Stjernfelt 2002: 342). 
Some of the researchers specify ‘self’ in the explanation of the dynamics of 
semiosis in living systems (Hoffmeyer 1998a, 2006, 2008b, 2013, 2014) or see it as 
dependent on the living being’s ‘capacity of sense’ (Goudsmit 2009). Thus, following 
this tendency Stjernfelt describes the character of  living systems as “an agency equipped 
with a point-of-view” (Stjernfelt 2002). Others derive the concept of self from the 
definition of sign relations given by Peirce (Sebeok 1991, 2001b; Uexküll 1995; Brier 
2008). Self is touched upon in the inquiry into heuristic potential of Juri Lotman’s 
semiotic theory with regard to biosemiotics (Kull 1999), as well as an attempt to ground 
a view on animal as a self-reading text (Uexküll et al. 1993; Kull 1998). Moreover, much 
attention has been focused on the possibility conditions and benefits of introducing the 
concept of agency in life sciences (Sharov 2002). Additionally, several specifications of 
self have emerged from the perspective of possible points of convergence between 
biosemiotics and autopoiesis theory (Weber 2002, Nishida 2011) and potential 
contributions of biosemiotics to neurosciences (Favareau 2002a, 2002b). Thus, for 
Favareau, the concept of ‘self’ is “a rich construction of internally biological, externally 
physical and historically situated, linguistically-mediated conceptual elements none of 
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which enjoy a privileged or autonomous causality in structuring or determining the 
resultant symbol […]” (Favareau 2002b: 10). 
The reformulation of the pair subjective-objective offered by Deely is also worth 
mentioning. For him, the world of which a particular organism is aware differs from the 
physical surroundings:  the latter is the subjective or physical world, “the world where 
things exists whether or not they are cognized”; the former is the objective world, “the 
world as it is apprehended and organized within apprehension”, which includes only a 
small part of the physical surrounding (Deely 2001:6). This enables him to take the 
umwelt comprising the subjectivity and species-specific network of relations as the 
objective world. Against this background the specificity of the human Umwelt resides in 
its being transcendent to biology: “The human animal is like other animals in living in an 
actual objective world or Umwelt; but they human animal is unlike all other animals (at 
least on this planet) in that its actual objective world admits of an indefinite number of 
alternative possibilities, some of which can be actualized in turn” (Ibid. 7-8).  
One of the main claims of biosemiotics is that the self is not primal, but 
culminative. This feature is tackled in inquiries into how endo- and exosemiotic processes 
produce a biological self. In this case, the self might be described as closely associated 
with processes aiming the preservation of bodily unity. Particularly, Hoffmeyer, Sebeok 
and Thure von Uexküll offer an examination of how a biological self is formed by 
interactions between the immune and nervous systems and how it adapts to changing 
processes in the surrounding of the organism (Hoffmeyer 2008a; Sebeok 1991; Uexkull, 
Geigges, Hermann 1993). In some cases, self is considered in connection with the set of 
pathologies or personality disorders that are supposedly caused by disturbance in sign 
processing. This vision is oriented to approach either human subjectivity in general 
(Rothschild 1962) or a pre-linguistic self as it is manifested on the level of phenomenal 
consciousness (Uexküll et al. 1993; Sebeok 2001a, Hoffmeyer 2008b). 
 If we accept that self is contiguous with, or amounts to, a semiotic individuality 
it is possible to speak of a prevalent role of indexicals in its constitution (Sebeok 1991, 
2001a, 2001b). Thus Sebeok writes: “The body of vertebrate, including humans, is 
composed of a veritable armamentarium of more or less palpable indexical markers of 
unique selfhood” (Sebeok 1994: 73). It is likewise possible to insist on the self being the 
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result of an upper symbolic level of ‘inner’ continuum of sign processes (Favareau 2002a, 
2002b). The acknowledgment that self requires other-reference or other-recognition 
opens up a way of thinking of it in a broader semiotic context as a problem of self-identity 
and otherness (Petrilli 2003). In some cases, subjectivity is considered from the 
perspective of intersubjective dimension inherent to it. Thus, Kawade seeks to reason a 
structure of subjectivity comprising three distinct components: an individual, phenomenal 
reality (umwelt) and society (Kawade 2001, 2009). On the other hand, a perspective on 
human self on a neurological level and with the view of recent discoveries of mirror 
neurons opens up a possibility to ground its intrinsically intersubjective nature (Favareau 
2002b, 2008).  
Nonetheless, there is a tendency in biosemiotics to take ‘self’ as a matter-of-fact 
term, which does not need clarification; rather, biosemioticians seem to proceed from the 
presumption of an intuitive understanding of this concept. ‘Self’ is further obscured 
because of the difficulty in defining it without enumerating attributes containing ‘self’ in 
their composition, such as self-reference, self-representation, self-experience etc. The 
situation with ‘subjectivity’ is slightly better since there are a few latent and explicit 
determinations of it scattered all over the works mentioned above. However, another issue 
arises from ‘self’, ‘subjectivity’, ‘subject’ and ‘agency’ being described with reference to 
one another. Moreover, the concept of ‘subject’ is a term that should be used carefully 
because of the context of its elaboration and its role in the history of modern Western 
philosophy. All this shows a pressing need to elaborate an integrated account of a 
biosemiotic approach to the self.  
With respect to philosophical implications of the given approach to the self, 
biosemiotics has a great merit to have offered an alternative to dualistic ontologies based 
on an unbridgeable divide between mind and matter, which originates in the philosophy 
of Descartes. This enables it to reconsider a problem of intentionality by appealing to a 
relational character of sign process. In the scope of analytic philosophy, intentionality it 
is at stake in theories that offer a higher-level account of self-consciousness (Gopnik 
1993, 1996; Heal 1996; Gordon 1996; Carruthers et al. 1996, Frith et al 1999), as well as 
theories that confront them by proposing a one-level account of self-consciousness 
(Zahavi 2006, 2011; Gallagher at al. 2008; Henry at al. 2011). Therefore, a new concept 
of intentionality offered by Hoffmeyer (1999, 2012, 2014) might contribute indirectly to 
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current debates over the self in philosophy of mind, although he does not follow up this 
possibility further and manages it with general suggestions with respect to the ‘hard 
problem of consciousness’. Hoffmeyer also argues that the body-mind duality should be 
discarded if any advances in studies on how consciousness could have emerged are to be 
achieved (1995b, 2013, 2014). Moreover, Hoffmeyer and Emmeche have focused much 
attention on the question of the subjective dimension of experiential life or qualia by 
treating it as an attribute of life, thereby rendering it a place in a scientific discourse 
(Emmeche 1999, 2001; Hoffmeyer 2006, 2008a, 2014). However, a general character of 
their suggestions creates obstacles on the way to integrate biosemiotics into particular 
controversies over related issues and the issue of self in particular. In the given work I 
will use some of the biosemiotic conceptions of self in order to substantiate a particular 
approach to pre-reflexive self-awareness. Specifically, I will show how the weak points 
of one of the most influential approaches to self in analytic philosophy – the so-called 
‘minimal self’– may be overcome with the help of some arguments elaborated from a 
biosemiotic approach to the self.  
The self in analytic philosophy has gained attention due to a general interest in 
phenomenal consciousness and a need to attend to self-consciousness in its elucidation. 
Recently issued “The Oxford Handbook of Self” (Gallagher ed. 2011), which comprises 
publications on the topic of self elaborated across a number of disciplines, including 
philosophy of mind, psychology and neurosciences, shows a growing recognition of the 
importance of this topic. Despite the fact that philosophical accounts of self often resort 
to data from developmental psychology, cognitive and neurosciences, biosemiotics is not 
in this trend at all. A possible reason for the disregard of biosemiotics might lie in the 
very specificity of it as a scientific endeavour; specifically, the production of empirical 
material is outside the biosemiotic domain for it seeks to interpret already existed data in 
a new synthesis and offer a theoretical framework, that is, theory and metatheory. 
Whereas philosophy of mind resorts to a big amount of data provided by cognitive and 
neurosciences, it may not need any external interpretative mode. Another reason why 
biosemiotics still has little or no position among disciplines supplying philosophy of mind 
with new ideas is that its language tends to be perceived as too metaphorical. Granted, 
this work is based on a presumption that particular biosemiotic concepts and arguments 
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might substantiate one specific position towards the self in contemporary debates over 
the pre-reflexive self-awareness in the philosophy of mind. 
Therefore, the aim of this work is an integrated account of the biosemiotic 
approach to the self and its integration into current debates over the self in analytic 
philosophy of mind. The achievement of this aim requires the realization of the following 
tasks:  
1) outline of the prerequisites of a biosemiotic approach to the self laid down in the 
works of precursors of biosemiotics;  
2) positioning of ‘self’ and related concepts ‘subjectivity’, ‘subject’, and ‘agency’ in 
the conceptual framework of biosemiotics;  
3) exposing conditions of a legitimate and grounded application of ‘subject’ and 
‘subjectivity’ in biosemiotics;  
4) analysis of particular biosemiotic conceptions of self; 
5) outline of two versions of ‘minimal self’ approach in philosophy of mind, their 
analysis from a biosemiotic point of view and suggestions of possible ways to 
their improvement.  
It should be stipulated that, the current work is more concentrated on The 
Copenhagen-Tartu school of biosemiotics that on other schools due to an explicit 
elaboration of the concept of biosemiotic self within its framework. However, some 
theories that have been formed outside of this school are examined as well. Moreover, the 
division of the work in two chapters is determined by the existence of two tendencies in 
thinking of self in biosemiotics. The first consists in the treatment of self as an 
autocommunicative system or, in other words, as a mode of being of the system. This 
tendency is manifested in attempts of biosemiotics to identify itself as a scientific 
discipline and in the way in which it relates itself to traditional paradigm in life sciences, 
that is, in the outline of its conceptual framework. Another tendency consists in 
meditation over what constitutes and maintains the self in living systems, what it means 
for living beings to have self, what is the evolutionary significance of experience and 
emotions with respect to preservation of self. Therefore, the self tends to be taken here as 
a ‘built’ bodily self that is possessed by living systems.  
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Finally, what needs to be stipulated is the position of the author of the work. As a 
researcher, I have a clear-cut identity as philosopher due to my academic background, my 
inclination towards philosophy, and the decision to specialize further in the analytic 
philosophy of mind. However, I believe that, from all semiotic disciplines, biosemiotics 
has the biggest viability and heuristic potential, especially with respect to philosophy. In 
addition, my future doctoral dissertation project is informed by biosemiotics and its main 
claims are influenced by theories of Jesper Hoffmeyer, Thure von Uexküll, Werner 
Geigges, Jörg Hermann, and Donald Favareau. Given that, this work offers a perspective 
on biosemiotics from the outside, specifically, from the point of view of continental 
philosophy represented by French and German traditions, as well as from the point of 
view of analytic philosophy. 
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Chapter 1. Mode of being: ‘self’ in conceptual framework of 
biosemiotics 
 
1.1. Prerequisites of a biosemiotic approach to the self in the works of 
Jakob von Uexküll and Friedrich Salomon Rothschild 
Even before the establishment of biosemiotics as a full-blown scientific discipline, 
prerequisites of “the inclusion of a controlled notion of ‘subject’ in biology” (Emmeche 
et al. 2002: 18) and an implicit biosemiotic concept of self were laid down in the first 
attempts to elaborate a semiotic viewpoint on living systems. Particularly, Friedrich S. 
Rothschild, a precursor of biosemiotics, tried to ground a new perspective on subjectivity 
according to which it was neither an epiphenomenon of the evolution of life, which would 
make it just an accident, nor an exclusively human attribute. Rather than speaking about 
subjectivity as an unmatched phenomenon Rothschild spoke about the degrees of 
subjectivity or its developmental stages presented in protozoa, invertebrates, vertebrates, 
and human (Rothschild 1962). The attribution of subjectivity to animals is also 
characteristic of the umwelt theory, elaborated by Jakob von Uexküll, another 
predecessor of biosemiotics. The early attempts to extend the terms ‘subject’ and 
‘subjectivity’ beyond a conventional domain of their application have contributed 
powerfully to the development of biosemiotics, in which subjectivity and the closely 
related concept of self constitute the framework of understanding the life.  
To begin with, an implicit biosemiotic conception of self was elaborated in the 
framework of Jakob von Uexküll’s theory of umwelt. The notion of umwelt has often 
been translated as a subjective universe of the animal. Nevertheless, the issue of 
subjectivity is by no means contingent in Uexküll’s works, for it is exactly where the 
novelty of his approach to the animal comes from. Specifically, it is the notion of subject 
as applied to the animal that enables to stress an active and transformative character of 
the animal’s interaction with its environment. For him, the world, if it is informative, 
cannot be neutral, impartial and free from any perspective; rather, it is the immersive 
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ambience for the animal. The world as it exists for it – and this is what implied by the 
concept of umwelt – comprises only meaningful relations or signs. Here in the very 
specification ‘subjective universe of the animal’ the opposition subjective-objective is 
raised. Yet, ‘objective’ refers to either an abstract idea of the neutral environment or the 
world as it is conceived of and endowed with normative meaning by the human. 
In other words, ‘subjective’ implies here the reference to an idiosyncratic and 
incarnated point of view. Such an investigating strategy was intended to offer an 
alternative to a mechanistic approach in biology (Uexküll 1992). His call for attending a 
phenomenal world of the animal was a proposal to look at what is meaningful for the 
animal in view of its successful performances. To put it another way, as long as it was the 
notion of meaning that was a guiding line in Uexküll’s studies of the animal’s life, the 
idiosyncratic perspective was understood as a result of the activity whereby the animal 
models its own world in terms of meaningful relations, absolutely necessary for its 
survival, which was termed “umwelt” and which could be judged by means of 
examination of the animal’s performances and bodily organization.  
Following this further, it is possible to say, that Uexküll’s theory of functional 
cycle lays down prerequisites for the concept of agency and the ground for affirmation of 
a processual character of self, which was later stressed by Thomas Sebeok and Thure von 
Uexküll (Sebeok 2001b, Uexküll 1995). It should be mentioned that Jakob von Uexküll 
himself did not use the term ‘agency’, although he is ascribed it retrospectively (Emmeche 
2001). However, this attribution is legitimate inasmuch as the animal’s mastering of its 
environment is understood in Uexküll’s works as an active interpretation, which supposes 
some degree of the autonomy and non-mechanistic causality. To begin with, the agency 
here is not a matter of spontaneity taken in terms of cause-effect relations because, for 
Uexküll, those can obtain only at the outer boundary of the organism where external 
stimuli are transformed into neural impulses. However, it is already here that the domain 
of purely mechanistic causality ends up to the extent that stimuli are taken in selectively. 
After that point different causality characterises the processes, so it is no longer the cause-
effect relationships, according to which processing of the information is structured and 
organized; rather, it is the assignment of the meaning to the input information, its coding 
in terms of an in-taking system resulting in creation of the perceptual sign. The latter is 
also referred by Jakob von Uexküll as the ‘ego-quality’ of an interpreting system.  
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For Uexküll, those perceptual signs are unified and projected back to the external 
world as the qualities of objects, which are referred as ‘perceptual cues’. What should be 
emphasized here is that objects enter into meaningful relationships with interpreting 
subjects, i. e. animals, to the degree that they are meaning-carriers. Further prerequisites 
for the development of the term ‘agency’ are delivered by the concept of functional cycle 
and particularly by the idea of extinguishing perceptual cues and their replacement by 
effectors cues. 
Figuratively speaking, every animal grasps its object with two arms of a forceps, receptor, and 
effector. With the one it invests the object with a receptor cue or perceptual meaning, with the 
other, an effector cue or operational meaning. But since all the traits of an object are structurally 
interconnected, the traits given operational meaning must affect those bearing perceptual 
meaning through the object, and so change the object itself. This is best expressed briefly as: the 
effector cue or meaning extinguishes the receptor cue or meaning. (Uexküll 1992: 323–324) 
It is important to stress here that, first of all, the object exists inasmuch it is attributed the 
qualities eliciting the functions it can perform for the animal in question or performances 
with that object, which are allowed with the view of its needs, or how Uexküll puts it, its 
mood (a qualitative characteristic guiding the animal’s behaviour). So the animal operates 
with the functional image it has generated, or to put it differently, the object matters only 
to the extent that the functional tone has been imparted to it: “Every action, therefore, that 
consists of perception and operation imprints its meaning on the meaningless object and 
thereby makes it into a subject-related meaning-carrier” (Uexküll 1982: 31). Objects can 
exist as real only if they have been transformed into perceptual cues and endowed with 
the functional tone (Uexküll 1992). This again stresses the fact that, in the scope of the 
umwelt theory, the only way of defining the self is through the objects, which are 
correlated with the organism due to their being meaning-carriers. The concept of 
functional cycle, thus, allows seeing one in the light of the other and, thereby, helps to 
avoid falling into a one-sided description of the self or impart some metaphysical meaning 
to it. 
Secondly, for Uexküll, there can be no single and ultimate model of the object perceived 
and acted upon inasmuch as the perceptual cue can be replaced by several functional 
images (effector cues) depending on the mood: the content of the meaning-carrier differs 
in various umwelten (Uexküll 1982). Following this further, an active and transformative 
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character of the animal’s mastering of its environment is also grounded with the help of 
such terms as ‘familiar path’, ‘search image’ and ‘innate path’ (along with magic umwelt), 
all of which reveal different degree of autonomy of animal’s interpretive activity from 
purely causal influence of external stimuli and the impossibility of its treatment as a mere 
reactions to them (Uexküll 1992). What also should be taken into account here is a kind 
of future-directedness of the animal’s interpretive activity, in that it is implemented in 
view of the animal’s surviving. 
Another predecessor of biosemiotics, Friedrich Salomon Rothschild, argued for 
the necessity to deal with subjectivity within the evolutionary framework. He tried to 
ground a hypothesis that the experiential life should be associated with sign-systems in 
their function of symbolic mediation (Rothschild 2000, 2010). Rothschild offered a 
perspective on the experience as interpretation of signs or making meaning of the 
organism’s situation in its environment. Rothschild’s project of biosemiotics is, therefore, 
an investigation into communication systems. It seeks to explain the formation of 
subjectivity and provide not only a new comprehensive and consistent model for it, which 
would eliminate both the dichotomy of body-mind and postulating their inconceivable 
unity, but also a new view on numerous personality disorders (Rothschild 2010). Thus, 
unlike Uexküll’s theory, the biosemiotic project of Rothschild is ultimately directed at 
elucidation of the human subjectivity, although this can be achieved, for him, only by 
means of a careful examination of the dynamics of sign systems (Rothschild 2000). In 
addition to this, related concepts ‘subjectivity’ and ‘self’ get somehow separated in his 
theory, which in some respect anticipates a subtle difference between them — peculiar to 
current biosemiotics — as well as the ground behind its insistence on the need of the 
concept ‘subjectivity’.  
Rothschild conceives of the evolution of living systems as the emergence and 
development of new sign-systems or modes of semiosis, which do not supersede one 
another but are superimposed in layers upon each other. Thus, the living experience turns 
out to be entirely determined by the top internal sign-system and, thereby, specific mode 
of semiosis, as well as interdependent communicative relations between current sign 
system and evolutionary preceding one, since it is the information of an already 
established stage that is reflected in a new synthesis within the new and superimposed 
system (Rothschild 2010:453). This suggests that not only the evolution of sign systems 
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but also the evolutionary process of adapting one sign-system to another should be in 
focus of the investigation (ibid. 450). The hierarchy of these inner sign-systems consists, 
for Rothschild, of somatic periphery (corresponding to the lowest level of communication 
processes), central nervous system (whose main task is integrating different modes of 
semiosis into an individual experience and behaviour) and, lastly, language, which is 
rated as the highest level and which allows interpreting the data provided by the central 
nervous system in a new way, that is, in thoughts and concepts (ibid. 459). Rothschild 
writes: 
In each stage, a new sign system overlays the already established ones and makes the unfolding 
of a new and higher level of experience possible. Using the information stored and forever 
reactualized within the phylogenetically older systems, man finally achieved his own depth and 
range of interpretation, and his freedom of response in the dialogue between self and the world. 
(ibid. 2010: 454) 
A new conception of subjectivity, which Rothschild offers in the scope of his ‘symbol 
theory of psychophysical relation’, assumes that “[…] history of subjectivity does not 
start with man, but the human spirit was preceded by many preliminary stages in the 
evolution of animals” (ibid. 462). For him, subjectivity of a living system is dependent 
on actual communication processes “that determine its linkage to reality” (ibid. 455). 
Subjectivity expresses itself “[…] through the spatial and temporal order of physical 
events or comprehends them, as signs, the meaning of these signs […]” (ibid. 455). This 
means that subjectivity is essentially bodily, in that its sense-making capability is 
implemented through the living processes.  
Further, it is the hierarchy of inner communication systems that constitutes the 
subjectivity on respective evolutionary stages. This makes the explanation of the 
lawfulness of this hierarchy a key point in Rothschild’s conception. Rothschild discloses 
the aforementioned lawfulness by averring three biosemiotic laws. By law, he 
understands “[…] the rules of syntax of each single communication system and the rules 
valid for the simultaneous utilization of different communication systems as they coexist 
in all animals and in man” (ibid. 456). Rothschild holds that there is a structural similarity 
between the syntax and the meaning of symbolic communication system, or to be more 
precise, the syntax and the mode of semiosis are connected in a lawful manner. 
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The first biosemiotic law deals with the inner self-assertion that transforms the organism 
from an object into a subject of meaning-making or semiosis. Namely, intention of self-
realization of an organism can be fulfilled only if the preservation of its unity against all 
agents of change is possible: “Only if this requirement of inner self-assertion is satisfied, 
that is, the established structure is secured as bearer of the own essence or the self, is self- 
realization possible” (ibid. 457). Therefore, this intention to preserve the self as a unity is 
a basic rule of biosemiotic syntax, that is, the syntax of a particular communication system 
as well as of its interaction with the previous one.  
The understanding of the second law requires, holds Rothschild, a reconsideration of the 
primal structure of life. Specifically, the self-realization demands communication with an 
alien element to recognize its character, to understand it in order to cope with it: “The 
monologue of the steadily repeated own word in self-reduplication had to be joined by a 
dialogue in which alien voices too could be heard” (ibid. 458). There being the conflict 
between the intentions of self-realization and recognition of the alien, it is possible for 
the life to develop its diversity only on condition of overcoming this conflict and contrast 
between the self and non-self. This leads to the second biosemiotic law, which Rothschild 
formulates in the following way: “Inner polarization is necessary in order to permit the 
subjectivity of organisms to communicate with the object of the world simultaneously 
with realization of the own self” (ibid. 459). On an elementary step, this polarization is 
represented by the formation of the cell and the diploidy of chromosomes that had 
initiated the inner duality within the unity of organism. 
Finally, the third law states that in order to develop its function a new system must 
dominate a more archaic one. There is a specific dependence of an emerged system on 
the previous and, at the same time, the former must dominate the latter. Every dominant 
system has to adapt to the dominated one since it depends on its information and semiotic 
activity (Ibid. 459). This tension between the required dominance and an informative 
dependence is crucial and most striking in the human subjectivity. Language as the 
highest inner sign system is not provided by nature but must be learned by an individual 
(Ibid. 459). Moreover, in this case, we cannot just speak about a new code for the already 
existing information. Rather, as Rothschild notices, while still being coded and decoded 
by nervous system, the data is comprehended in a new mode of semiosis, which is a 
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logical thinking. In this mode, the thought and will emerge and the transformation of 
perception and behaviour takes place (Ibid. 459). 
What is of considerable value in Rothschild’s conception of subjectivity is that he 
singles out the dynamics of personality as resulted from the opposition or even tension 
between new and more archaic subjectivities. To be more precise, the personality 
dynamics proceeds from the antinomy of dominance and interdependence. An individual 
needs the data and semiotic activity, which are provided by previous system, to realize 
him or herself, to create the image of their own body along with the image of the outside 
world. By Rothschild, this means that subjectivity must fulfil the first and the second 
biosemiotic laws prevailing in any given system: first, the true self-realization is possible 
if and only if the inner “unity with materiality and emotionality” is achieved; second, the 
human must recognize a necessary interrelation between ego and non-ego as a 
prerequisite of communication (Ibid. 461). Rothschild concludes: “Each personality 
reveals in its characteristics the measure of success and failure that the self achieved in 
confrontation with his long history of evolution” (Ibid. 461).  
Thus, the specificity of Rothschild’s conception of subjectivity resides in its being 
derivative from sign systems or modes of semiosis, which leads to the thesis about the 
possibility to afford subjectivity to various living systems, and even of the conflict 
between subjectivities. Although less explicitly than Uexküll, Rothschild calls for 
introducing a new kind of causality, different from mechanistic, into a scientific 
discourse. Apart from lawful relations between internal sign systems, each step in the 
evolution of subjectivity supposes, for him, a respective degree of “freedom of response 
in the dialogue between self and the world […]” afforded to an individual by the top sign 
system and the interdependent communication between it and a more archaic system 
(Ibid. 454).  
Finally, as previously mentioned, Rothschild makes a subtle discrimination 
between the related terms of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘self’, in that the self, or the unity of 
experiential life, is dependent on the relations of dominance and subordination between 
subjectivities of the two internal sing systems. Against this background, the self turns out 
something that is gained and preserved, and a living system is taken to be a ‘bearer of 
self’ as long as it exists as a distinct and not a fragmented whole. Overall, it is the integrity 
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as a precondition of a self-realizing project of the organism that is emphasized in the 
concept of self in Rothschild’s works.  
 
1.2. ‘Self’ in conceptual framework of biosemiotics: vindication of 
‘final cause’ 
A careful examination of the works of predecessors of biosemiotics has shown that the 
introduction of the concepts of self and subjectivity in a biological discourse was 
congruent with the attempt to posit the causality different from a mechanistic cause-and-
effect relation. The same strategy is characteristic of contemporary biosemiotics, in which 
the attribution of ‘self’, ‘subjectivity’ to living systems and affirmation of life’s own 
causality are two sides of the same coin. This constitutes the way in which biosemiotics 
defines itself as a scientific project that offers “a theoretical framework for understanding 
living systems very differently from the metaphysical idea that cells and organisms are 
simply organized organic molecules” (Emmeche et al. 2002:7). The search for and 
assertion of the new causality guarantees biosemiotics an unconventional perspective on 
a set of vexed points that not only biology but, more importantly, philosophy, as 
represented by contemporary analytic tradition, has doomed to be intractable or driven to 
the periphery of a scientific discourse. Given that, this section is intended to show how 
closely related concepts of self and subjectivity arise in the conceptual framework of 
biosemiotics. 
A contemporary biosemiotician, Jesper Hoffmeyer, defines biosemiotics as an 
“interdisciplinary scientific project that is based on the recognition that life is 
fundamentally grounded in semiotic processes” (Hoffmeyer 2008:3), or as an 
“understanding of living systems that takes sign processes or semiosis to be constitutive 
for life” (Hoffmeyer 2012:105). Those definitions supposedly allude to Thomas Sebeok’s 
famous motto “a full understanding of the dynamics of semiosis may in the last analysis 
turn out to be no less than the definition of life” (Sebeok 1979:26). Accordingly, 
understanding of live as based on the generation, action and interpretation of signs 
assumes specific causality and the attribution of ‘self’ even to the cell, which is afforded 
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a status of “the simplest entity to possess real semiotic competence […]” (Emmeche et 
al. 2002:16). 
To begin with, the concept of self figures in the specification of ‘semiosis’ given 
by Sebeok himself in a series of articles, which sought to lay down the grounds of an 
explicit approach to the self, or, how he termed it, ‘the semiotic self’: “The clandestine 
interpreter of symptoms is, by definition, the semiotic self. This interpreter corresponds 
to what Jakob von Uexküll identified, on the cellular level, as ‘Ich-tone’, usually rendered 
into English as ‘ego-quality’” (Sebeok 2001b:134). For Sebeok, ‘Ich-tone’ is similar to 
‘to somebody’ in Peircean definition of sign. Likewise, Jesper Hoffmeyer takes Peircean 
triad as a point of departure in thinking about processes of life claiming that it is “[…] a 
purely logical relation to be established in any system capable of autonomous anticipatory 
activity – that is, all living systems” (Hoffmeyer 2013:152).  
Apparently, in this definition ‘autonomy’ and ‘anticipation’ are indicative of one 
of the main explanatory strategies in biosemiotics, which can be articulated as follows: 
the causality, different from cause-and-effect relation, should be vindicated if the 
emergence and evolution of life are to be handled in a satisfactory way. Hoffmeyer picks 
up the term ‘final cause’ to designate this causality, which he, following Peirce, 
understands not as purposive, consciously conceived end cause, valid only in the context 
of human agency, but as a general principle of causation1. There being the rejection of 
the final cause in a traditional paradigm of the explanation of life, its acceptance 
constitutes a specificity of biosemiotics as an interdisciplinary scientific endeavour: “[…] 
it must be concluded that life and final causation is – at least potentially – inherent in the 
fundamental physics of our universe and rather than tabooing final causation right away 
we should make a distinction between acceptance and nonacceptance of final causation” 
(Hoffmeyer 2014:98).  
In the scope of the semiotic understanding of life, Hoffmeyer specifies final 
causation as a ‘semiotic causation’:  
                                                             
1 Causation is definied in OED as „the action of causing“ and  „the relationship between cause and effect; 
causality“, which makes, in some cases, ’causality’ and ’causation’ mutually substitutive terms 
(http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/) 
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Semiotic causation is based on a ‘trigger-mechanism’ whereby an interpreting system creates the 
interpretative response by its own means, not by any external intervention – apart from whatever 
‘trigger-event’ it has learned to select. For this reason there is no need for physical compatibility 
between the sign and the activity it releases […] (Hoffmeyer 2012:109)  
Although there seem to be an agreement over the need to ground new causality, 
there might be a different point of view on the choice of terminology. Thus, Deeley 
stipulates for specificative or objective causality, which is traditionally required to explain 
cognition and psychological states. For him, the action of sings is exactly a species of the 
objective causality, rather than a species of a final causality. Specificative causality 
appears to be more general than the final causality “inasmuch as it specifies equally both 
vital activity and the chance interactions of brute secondness at the level of inorganic 
nature” (Deely 2001:634). In other words, only this causality is suited to ground sign-
behaviour in chance occurrences. However, this does not change the main line of thought, 
according to which it is the grounding of new causality that ultimately brings about the 
concept of self. 
As seen from the passage above, it is a relational nature of the sign, that is, its 
being a relation or process, which calls for a relation, that bears on the possibility of the 
new causality. This also opens up a new possibility to explain the phenomenal life: 
However, while an explanation in terms of mechanistic or informational models leaves us with 
a downright impossible problem, the semiotic model points us to emphasize relational 
phenomena that, in principle, are independent of the substantiality of related entities, and this 
opens new channels of explanation. (Hoffmeyer 2014:103) 
Interpretant is a relational and mediating process inside the interpreter, “a process 
whereby the perceived sign vehicle becomes related to the object, in such a way that it 
somehow mimics the sign vehicle’s own relation to that same object” (Hoffmeyer 
2014:103). An interpretant is always created as context sensitive response to an event, is 
never given for good and is a result of the organism’s history, which suggests that that 
former experiences influence the interpretative process from the earliest stages. 
Therefore, the independence of interpretants from materiality of the sign relata, their 
unlimited diversity due to the context and needs of the organism, an autopoietic character 
of interpretation, in the course of which one interpretant gets extinguished by another – 
all these features, which were already touched upon in the works of Jakob von Uexküll, 
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show that the sing process does not cause the response in a traditional sense of efficient 
causation, but it stipulates for admitting the semiotic causation, or “bringing about things 
under the guidance of interpretation in a local context” (Hoffmeyer 2008b:37). 
The vindication of final cause, for Hoffmeyer, points to the need to eliminate the 
‘sensory mechanics’ principle, which is taken as an explanation of how an external world 
enters the mind. Instead, ‘sensory mechanics’ should be replaced by ‘sensory semiotics’; 
and instead of a ‘mechanic body’, life sciences should take a ‘semiotic body’ as a starting 
point. (Hoffmeyer 2014:95). In the same vein, it allows considering sensation as an open-
ended loop of interactions between memory, sensory impulses, and motor activity. 
Furthermore, the adoption of the new causality leads to positing one of the most ambitious 
claims of biosemiotics, according to which the intentionality of phenomenal 
consciousness is a special and highly sophisticated instantiation of a more general bodily 
intentionality, whose history is co-extensive with the natural history of signification.  
From this perspective, the bridge from semiotic causation to the realization of final 
cause in an evolutionary framework lies through the foundation of ‘semiotic realism’ on 
the issue of intentionality, namely, the perspective on intentionality as implicit in 
semiosis. Specifically, Hoffmeyer proceeds from semiotic realism of Peirce who 
grounded intentionality in a generalized treatment of semiosis. For Hoffmeyer, this triadic 
notion points to intentionality because to the interpreter the sign is ‘about’ something, 
and, being the system in which the interpretant is formed, the interpreter is not necessarily 
a human being. Consequently, human intentionality appears as resultant from a general 
dynamics of semiosis in nature: “The way the outside world of an organism and its inside 
world are connected is not, in this view, by way of something from the outside entering 
into the inside, but by the formation in the organism of a sign relation connecting it to the 
outside world through an interpretative act” (Hoffmeyer 2012:101). 
In the context of survival strategies of living beings, the capability of the sign 
vehicle to point to something else, or to be about something else, is what opens a 
possibility of anticipation. To put it another way, intentionality resides in anticipation 
where present cues point to future conditions (Hoffmeyer 2013). The activities of living 
beings are always goal-directed: they all depend on a capacity to envisage a range of 
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possible dangers, as well as where various resources may be available. With respect to 
this Hoffmeyer contends: 
To achieve this organisms produce internal ‘models’ of significant part of their surroundings, or 
Umwelts […] Although the Umwelts of animal may seem extremely limited in both spatial and 
temporal variety, when compared to our own human Umwelts, they nevertheless usually serve 
them well in making life-saving choices of action. (Hoffmeyer 2014:100) 
As a result, the evolutionary dynamics could be reflected in the creation of species 
possessing yet more sophisticated umwelten, which match deeper levels of environmental 
dynamics, or in the creation of species possessing more and more ‘semiotic freedom’.  
Hoffmeyer defines ‘semiotic freedom’ as a tendency towards the production of 
species which demonstrate a bigger semiotic competence in the sense of ‘[…] increased 
capacity for responding to a variety of signs through the formation of (locally) meaningful 
interpretants” (Hoffmeyer 2010:196). Semiotic freedom might be seen as one of the 
survival strategies in evolution, which would be best suited to free moving species 
because of the need in them to handle a huge amount of data provided by fast spatial 
variations (Hoffmeyer 2014:98-99). Incremental semiotic freedom reverberates through 
the species’ behaviour becoming less and less constrained by the natural lawfulness and 
increasingly hinging upon the interpretative capacity of organisms (Hoffmeyer 
2013:162). Given that, increasing semiotic freedom would then feed back into the 
evolutionary process by strengthening the advantages of species that are in possession of 
it. In addition, Hoffmeyer notices that on early stages of evolution semiotic freedom might 
primarily be revealed at the level of lineage, and “only gradually would emerge a more 
advanced stage of biosemiosis, in which semiotic activity was no longer a property of the 
lineage but also, and importantly so, a property of individual organisms” (Hoffmeyer 
2012:112).  
 
1.3. ‘Self’ in conceptual framework of biosemiotics: substantiation of 
‘agency’ 
The appellation of biosemiotics to the new causality – as represented by either final cause 
or objective causality – in its attempt to offer a new framework of understanding of life 
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is also realised by way of affording ‘agency’ to living units, which is regarded here as 
their capability to generate end-directed behaviours (Hoffmeyer 2013:148). Agency, 
therefore, becomes one of the main conceptual tools in biosemiotic handling of the 
emergence and evolution of life. In other words, biosemiotics proceeds from the treatment 
of agency as a real property of life residing in the capacity of organisms to interpret signs, 
or the “the capacity for making contingent choices internally” (Hoffmeyer 2006: 22).  
In the same vein, the ascription of agency to living systems marks the rejection of 
an externalist perspective on the evolutionary dynamics. Externalism seeks to explain 
internal properties of organisms and their adaptations exclusively in terms of their 
environments and natural selection pressure. Looking at macroevolution as nothing more 
than the extension of microevolution in time, it cannot admit the interpretative agency as 
a real property of organismic life despite the fact that introducing agency in the 
evolutionary context would resonate well with a highly context sensitive character of the 
information carried by genes and, thereby, unacceptability of the genetic determinism.  
 Contrary to externalism, biosemiotics offers an internalist point of view, which 
asserts the lawfulness immanent in processes of life, assigns agency to individuals and is 
motivated by intrinsically teleological character of semiosis. An internalist position in 
biosemiotics then would appear justified in an attempt “[…] to explain how agency and 
semiosis could arise in the course of processes that finally led to the formation of living 
systems” (Hoffmeyer 2013: 156). In addition, internalism gains in significance in 
response to the externalism’s failure to produce a satisfactory theory of the evolution of 
life. Hoffmeyer justifies this step in the following way: 
By according agency to individual organisms, and even cells and embryos, a creative element is 
introduced in the world that has been forbidden ever since the Newtonian revolution. And the 
automatic explaining away of this agency by claiming it to be a product of natural selection is 
logically excluded in this case, since the whole reason why agency must be ascribed to 
organismic systems was that natural selection could not itself produce the variations upon which 
it acts. Or, in other words, without agency, there is no natural selection. (Hoffmeyer 2013:151) 
Here it must be stressed that it is the introduction of ‘agency’ in the elucidation of 
life that paves the way for the concept of subject being extended beyond a human domain 
specifically, as well as for the treatment of any living system as being the self. For 
instance, for Hoffmeyer, all living systems are subjects “[…] in the sense that they are 
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semiotic agents capable of interacting with their surrounding in ‘intelligent’ ways” 
(Hoffmeyer 2008a:205). To recap, the status of subject can be ascribed to any living being 
insofar as it is a semiotic agent, and the ability of any living system to be agentive amounts 
to its being the self. However, the position of Hoffmeyer may be criticized as he seems 
to confine the subjectivity to agency, thereby realizing a common dissymmetry between 
two attributes of a cognitively sentient being: ‘agent’, or ‘agentivity’, and ‘sentient’, or 
‘sentiency’. Ikegami offers a careful linguistic examination of this pair, which, if applied 
in the current work, may show a weak point in Hoffmeyer’s reasoning brought about by 
the tendency to prioritize agency over sentience in ordinary discourse. As Ikegami 
notices, ‘agent’ is associated with a source, from which the action causing the change of 
the situation starts, while ‘sentient’ is associated with a goal to which a stimulus comes 
(Ikegami 1994:326). Agent serves as “a basis for the type of semiosis in which the subject 
is clearly separated from the object – which again will serve as a basis for the type of 
semiosis with a focus on clearer semiosis. The latter underlies the type of semiosis in 
which the subject is not clearly separated from, but is merged with, the object […]” (Ibid. 
328). This makes obvious some inconsistency in Hoffmeyer’s tendency to equate the 
subject with an agent on the terminological level, although there is no strict separation 
between the object and the subject in the interpretative agency, which all the more 
requires some qualitative aspects of signs. Deely also suggests that subjectivity does not 
amount to agency exlusively, but must include other attributes, among which he stress 
passion, according to which an individual is considered as acted upon by another agent. 
In addition, action and passion are not considered by him as relations of cause and effect, 
but as “foundations and terminations in subjectivity of those relations” (Deely 2001:76).  
Apparently, the specificity of biosemiotic treatment of ‘subject’ and ‘agency’, as 
well as of its approach to life springs from ‘agency’ being co-extensive with ‘selfhood’, 
which allows restating the former as tendency of the living being “to incorporate 
interactive events into its own project of survival” (Hoffmeyer 2008a:13). Therefore, life 
and selfhood are considered to exist in the system of mutual references and cannot be 
conceived of separately inasmuch as understanding of life becomes inextricable from 
explication of semiosis. In addition to this, it is a specifically semiotic dimension of 
agency and, thereby, selfhood that determines the novelty of biosemiotic approaches to 
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the self and which singles them out from the background of the dynamic system approach, 
artificial intelligence and autopoiesis theory.  
In order to stress this novelty, we can refer to the way of how Hoffmeyer shows 
incompleteness of any theory of self-organization in explanation of life insofar as they 
leave out “the semiotic aspect of selfhood” and fail to answer “the question of how the 
possession of subjectivity affects the living system under study” (Hoffmeyer 2008a: 178, 
183). For him, it remains unexplained “how the element of first-person perspective that 
necessarily clings to intentionality – i.e., the fact that intentionality always presupposes 
an intentional subject – might possibly have appeared out of sheer complexity” 
(Hoffmeyer 2008a:178). The novelty comes from thinking of agency as not only self-
assertion of any living being but as a primarily interpreting activity serving one’s own 
project of self-preservation. A semiotic aspect of selfhood may be specified here by 
appealing to a relational character of interpretants and the source of their unlimited 
diversity; it is, besides, what ultimately motivates insistence of biosemiotics on 
subjectivity being ‘more-or-less phenomenon’ and the applicability of the term to all 
living beings. A semiotic explanation of selfhood or accentuation of its semiotic aspect 
allows biosemiotics to address the first-person perspective of phenomenal life and the 
very experiential component of life, or qualia: 
Every person is genuinely an ‘I’ phenomenon, whereas complexity in principle can be 
exhaustively described as an ‘it’ phenomenon. How ‘it’ can possibly become ‘I’ is the puzzle 
that must be explained – and not even dynamic system theory does yet offer a solution to this 
puzzle. What is missing, I would argue, is the admission of a semiotic dimension of explanation. 
(Hoffmeyer 2008a:179) 
Seemingly, the very concept of umwelt may function as an argument against 
treating organic life as an instance of an abstract life form simulated by computers. 
(Hoffmeyer 2008a:176). Thus, Clause Emmeche contends that umwelt exists in a mode 
of an experiencing subject and therefore cannot be seen or described from a purely 
external point of view. This subjective aspect of animal sensation can be approached by 
semiotics due to its triadic sign relations basis, which are “[…] truly significant (in the 
inner experiential sense) for the animal in question” (Emmeche 2001:680). According to 
Peircean conception of sign every sign, in addition to being a token of some type, has also 
an aspect of being a tone, or being qualitatively felt in some way or other. How Emmeche 
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puts this: “The tone/token/type is a genuine triad, where the firstness property of the tone 
is always partly hidden, so to speak, within the ‘objective’ or more external property of 
that sign’s belonging to a type” (Ibid. 680). Thus, the umwelt is dependent on qualitative 
aspects of sing action and sign interpretation. 
In contrast to this, the issue of subjectivity, or the first-person perspective in 
experiential life, has been granted the status of one of the major intractable problems in 
philosophy of mind. Thus, Thomas Nagel contends that explaining subjective experience, 
or how something appears to somebody differently from the way it appears to anyone 
else, is currently beyond the reach of scientific grasp since the scientific understanding 
by definition takes an objective and externalist perspective, which directly confronts a 
subjective first-person point of view (Nagel 1974). 
Conversely, biosemiotics claims that “the experiential component of life, qualia, 
is thus seen as an integral aspect of life as such – an aspect that has its own evolutionary 
history from its most primitive forms in prokaryotic life to the sophisticated kinds of 
Umwelts that we find in big-brained animals” (Hoffmeyer 2008a:181). This status of 
qualia as “an integral aspect of life” resides in qualitative tones of signs, or, how Thure 
von Uexküll puts it, in a private character of signs and a public character of their signified 
objects. For him, this duality of signs bears on any attempt to ground the feasibility of 
biosemiotics. What is more important, the private character of signs is “one of the most 
convincing arguments for the existence of a ‘semiotic self’ in anthropo- and biosemiotics” 
(Uexküll 1995:101). “Each sign contain the ‘self’ of its receiver as a distinctive code” 
(Uexküll, Geigges, Hermann 1993:35), meaning that the umwelt comprises signs that are 
accessible only to an encoding subject and are just ‘noise’ to all others due to the private 
character of signs. Thure von Uexküll demonstrates it this way: “The private character of 
signs and their hidden interpreter – ‘semiotic self’ – is the basis for ‘identity’ and 
‘individuality’, both of them qualities, that can’t be shared” (Uexküll 1995:102-102). 
Overall, subjectivity and qualia are part of a conceptual framework of 
biosemiotics, that is, they contribute to formation of a biosemiotic approach to the life. 
Therefore, rather than questioning the ontological status of qualia or the first-person 
dimension of phenomenal life, biosemiotics seeks to find their evolutionary significance. 
In other words, instead of eliminating those issues from a scientific inquiry, biosemiotics 
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strives for answering the question of how anything in the world can have a subjective 
point of view. Hoffmeyer answers it in an evolutionary framework by seeing “a natural 
history of subjectivity” reflected in a built-in tendency “[…] to create more and more 
sophisticated semiotic interactions which were less and less constrained by the laws of 
the material world from which they were ultimately derived” (Hoffmeyer 2006:21). By 
him, this process has finally led to the creation of self-conscious and intelligent beings 
(Ibid. 21). 
What is important here is the accentuation of the first-person perspective in the 
concept of subjectivity. The first-person perspective of experiential life can be taken in a 
more general sense as a case of unique idiosyncratic perspective, meaning that it is not a 
derivative or epiphenomenal feature of the experience but attributive one. What should 
also be taken into account is that the idiosyncratic perspective in question is by no means 
a point of view from nowhere; instead, it has to be described in terms of bodily immersion 
into one’s environment. This leads to the suggestion that the experience has primitive 
parallels all over the life world, and thereby, we arrive again at the thesis that subjectivity, 
is not a ‘either-or’ but rather a ‘more-or-less phenomenon’, which was articulated by 
Hoffmeyer as the third thesis of biosemiotics (Hoffmeyer 1997). 
Finally, another constituent of biosemiotic notion of self derived from the 
specification of sign process is already prompted in Jakob von Uexküll’s statement that 
animal’s world or umwelt is modelled with reference to what is significant or relevant for 
its successful performances. Thure von Uexküll, Werner Geigges, and Jörg Hermann 
make this explicit by defining the semiotic self through the need and ‘reference-value’. 
For them, all the interpreter’s relationship with the other elements of sign process is 
determined by the need. They assume Jacques Piaget definition of need as presupposing 
“an organization in ‘mobile balance’ of which it simply indicates a transitory imbalance 
[…]”, and as “the expression of a totality momentarily incomplete and tending toward 
reconstituting itself” (Piaget 1952: 44). Applying such “totalities tending toward 
reconstituting themselves” to the context of sign process, they conclude that ‘totality’ 
becomes completed only when the meaning is utilized, or to be more precise, when the 
living systems responds to stimuli with the behaviour or affordance, and the ‘object’ is 
established (Uexküll et al. 1993:16).  
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Then, on all levels of life, from subcellular to organismic, the construction and 
preservation of living systems, regarded as totalities “momentarily incomplete and 
tending toward reconstituting themselves”, takes place by assimilation of fragments of 
their surroundings as ‘non-self’. Those processes are governed by signs, in that it is signs 
that ascribe a positive meaning (being beneficial) or negative (being harmful) to ‘non-
self’ in accordance to its relevance to the survival project of the living system (Uexküll 
et al. 1993:19). This perspective on living systems is considered to take into account “the 
whole action”; thus, a tetradic conception of sign, elaborated by Jesper Hoffmeyer and 
Claus Emmeche on the basis of Peircean triadic concept, is preferred. In other words, the 
introduction of the fourth element, that is, the effector in the sign relation, allows them to 
accentuate that, in reality, not only reflection but also action is always involved in the use 
of signs. As a part of an active life, interpretation triggers some behaviour involving the 
object denoted to by the sign. 
Thus, a living system, “[…] with receptor for taking in environmental influences 
as sign vehicles and an effector for answering with a behavior or affordance”, gets 
included into the formula of sign relation (Ibid. 14). Then, the process of sign 
interpretation may be specified in a way which singles out an active role of self: 
interpretant attributes a certain meaning to the sign vehicles of the receptor’s responses, 
thereby encoding them into signs; this entails a response for the effector, or creation of 
an affordance; the interaction of the effector’s affordance with the environment’s 
counteraffordance leads the generation of a signified or denoted object; thus the meaning 
is utilized and momentary imbalance is smoothed away. Affordances, or the effector’s 
response leading to generation of the object, are meaningful only with regard to the 
interpretant, or, how they consider it, ‘the reference value’ (Ibid. 14). In cybernetic 
machines ‘reference value’ is imposed from the outside, whereas it is immanent in living 
systems. In other words, only that meaning is followed by the living system, which related 
parts of its environment assume for its survival. Thus, rather than having a status of entity, 
the self of living systems appears to be process (of resuming ‘mobile balance’) with the 
need or ‘a transitory imbalance’ being necessary condition of its continuation.  
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1.4. ‘Superficial’ self, and origins of life 
Yet, the issue of qualia and idiosyncratic point of view does not exhaust completely a 
biosemiotic treatment of self as a mode of existence of living systems. Biosemiotics thus 
goes further by separating ‘self’ from ‘subjectivity’ and seeking for a topological 
definition of self, which would account for that idiosyncratic point of view peculiar to all 
living beings. And it is precisely where selfhood of living systems becomes identified 
with ‘subject-ness’, and the origin of life is attended to in the first place. 
According to Hoffmeyer, one of the keys to a biosemiotic theory of origins of life, 
or, how he terms it, ‘subject-ness’2, is a process of the asymmetry formation through 
membrane closing, followed by the development of mechanisms for semiotic interaction 
across this membrane (Hoffmeyer 1998:35). Membrane figures here as an elementary 
realization of a more general principle, namely, surface principle or that of a ‘semiotic 
interface’: “The membranes of living systems – at whatever level, i.e. whether they 
encircle sub-cellular organelles, cells, tissues, organs, or organisms – are in fact best 
described as interfaces facilitating a highly regulated exchange of signs between interiors 
and exteriors” (Hoffmeyer 1998a:36). 
To recap, ‘semiotic interface’ is a general principle of functioning of natural 
surfaces on different levels, of which the skin and cell membrane are the two utmost 
realizations.  In order to understand a living system in its end-directed interaction with its 
environment, a spatial and structural separation between the system and its environment 
needs addressing. To put it differently, life, agency, and semiosis are co-existent and “[…] 
the formation of a closed space defining an inside-outside asymmetry must have been a 
decisive step on the path leading to appearance of living systems” (Hoffmeyer 2013:158). 
A fundamental asymmetry on which the life is built is detailed further as the asymmetry 
between ‘inside exterior’ and ‘outside interior’, which supposes the establishment of an 
inside representation of what is going on outside of the system (Hoffmeyer 2013:158; 
Hoffmeyer 1998: 41).  
                                                             
2 Hoffmeyer coins this term, and this spelling with hyphen will be preserved whenever his concept is 
implied. 
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A constitutive role of the asymmetry between the ‘inside exterior’ and ‘outside 
interior’ and the formation of an inner representation of the outside suggest that the issue 
of selfhood is closely associated with that of biological reference. For Hoffmeyer, self-
assertion alone is not enough for a biosemiotic explanation of life. What is also needed 
here is other-reference, or other-representation. In other words, the self exists only insofar 
as that, which is inside, contains a reference to what is outside. Nevertheless, this outward 
reference rests upon a corresponding inward reference, such that it becomes possible to 
say that other-reference presupposes self-reference (Hoffmeyer 2008a: 26). By virtue of 
this, we have approached another prerequisite for the emergence of life and subject-ness. 
Specifically, subject-ness presuppose a double asymmetry, or realisation of a temporal 
asymmetry through the afore-mentioned spatial one. Hoffmeyer writes in this respect: 
The answer is that self-ness presupposes temporality, a self must have an internal temporal link 
for otherwise it would be meaningless to say that the world matters to it. If something should 
matter to a system then the system must have an existence in time. The ‘written record’ or DNA-
description serves as a ‘present’ memory (a proto-value) linking past and future around it. The 
temporal surface is linked to the spatial surface, the two asymmetries are integrated: time is 
situated and loaded with agency […] (Hoffmeyer 1998:42) 
Thus, the integration of those asymmetries creates a necessary precondition of the 
subject-ness taken as criterion of discrimination between living and non-living systems. 
Moreover, it ultimately grounds the claim that even non-human living systems might be 
considered subjects in a very general sense of the word: “Living creatures are self-
referential, they have a history, they react selectively to their surroundings and they 
participate in the evolutionary incorporation of the present in the future” (Hoffmeyer 
1996: 51). What is crucial for the tasks of this work is that we can finally outline a more 
or less complete set of attributes of subject-ness or selfhood in biosemiotics: self-
reference, history, ability to react selectively and future-directedness. On a stage when 
life and selfhood emerge, selective reactions are realized by cells, whereas history and 
future-directedness are assured by DNA, which serves as an evolutionarily primary 
mechanism of anticipation and, in its functioning as a proto-value, it determines the 
establishment of reference-value for the system’s activity.  
As previously stated, biosemiotics grounds the need for causality immanent in 
processes of life by demonstrating how agency and semiosis could arise in the course of 
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processes triggering the formation of living systems. As a realization of this strategy, 
Hoffmeyer offers a five-step model of origins of life, which stresses a constitutive role of 
both asymmetries, the agency and a semiotic interface. Specifically, the source of agency 
is questioned and the principle of ‘code-duality’ as an ultimate criterion of discrimination 
between life and non-life is established here.  
To begin with, for Hoffmeyer, it would be fallible to think that it is DNA that 
controls and directs agency or life’s activity in the first place. Instead, what coordinates 
biochemical and physiological processes is the membrane. Accordingly, it is in the 
semiotic function of the cell membrane that the source of agency should be found: “It is, 
in other words, in the semiotic functioning of the cellular membrane that we shall seek 
what can be called life’s agency, its inherent future-directedness, its survival project” 
(Hoffmeyer 2008a:32).  
Following this further, ‘code-duality’ refers to living systems forming a unity of 
two coded and interacting messages, namely an analogly coded message of the organism 
and its re-description in the digital code of DNA. Organisms, in their capacity of analog 
codes, recognize and interact with each other in the ecological space, whereas, as digital 
codes, they are carried forward from one generation to another (Hoffmeyer 1998a:34). 
Besides, as a defining criterion for being alive, the principle of code-duality excludes 
computers “[…] since they have not (at least not yet) been constructed to depend on the 
creativity of an analogly coded version interacting with real world processes in such a 
way as to test the fitness of the digital specifications necessary for its own construction” 
(Ibid. 35). Moreover, code-dual systems are anticipatory in that the digital code records 
specifications that worked well in the past and that are then used by organisms to cope 
with an immediate future, which assures the survival into a more distant future. This is 
the anticipation in a primitive sense; however, as has already been said, “the 
fundamentally semiotic character of this system very early in evolution assured the 
creation of sophisticated sense facilities to strengthen anticipation” (Ibid. 34).  
In defining the first step in his model of a prebiotic evolution, Hoffmeyer appeals 
to the Kauffman’s theory of life’s emergence where autocatalytic self-sufficiency is taken 
as the main stage and a condition for the development of living systems from chemical 
systems. Nonetheless, in the five-step model the formation of an autocatalytically closed 
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system, which becomes just the first step of a prebiotic evolution, does not suffice for the 
life to emerge. Rather, there must be established a condition of possibility of semiosis. 
Therefore, the second step consists in establishing of proto-membrane as a prerequisite 
for the basic asymmetry between inside and outside, which makes life-sustaining semiosis 
with its environment possible (Hoffmeyer 2008a:35). However, the autocatalytic system 
enclosed within the protomembrane cannot yet be assigned a status of living system for 
it is incapable of an autonomous agency, or in other words, there is no project sustaining 
the self.  
Thus, the solution might be found in supplying the given closed system with the 
other-reference based on the self-reference. Hence, the third step consists in the 
emergence of a higher-order autocatalysis in swarms of membrane units, which means 
that “[…] there must be established not only one closed membrane system, but a whole 
swarm of closed membrane interacting chemically and reciprocally through the flows 
across their membranes” (Hoffmeyer 2008a: 35-36).  The third step may be explained by 
the reference to the way biosemiotics situates the object under the study in a broader 
context: a single unit is nothing on its own, “[…] nothing in the cell or the organism 
makes sense if not seen in the perspective of the organizing influence of this deeply 
semiotic system” (Hoffmeyer 1998a:35). Likewise, the environment is not an unspecified 
outside but that which contains more or less equally active entities. This also anticipates 
the problem of semiotic emergence, i.e. the emergence of higher-level patterns – in this 
context, the capacity of the autonomous biological agency – from the semiotic 
interrelation between particular units or elements. 
Following this further, the fourth step suggests the establishment of a self-
reference system through digital re-description of protein components in DNA and RNA. 
However, the self-reference alone does not suffice for the emergence of agency and 
selfhood because, as Hoffmeyer contends, the system still has no way to assist the 
fulfilment of its own ‘interest’, or it has no mechanism for goal-directed action 
(Hoffmeyer 1998a). In other words, the system is not “an agent in its own interests”: it 
does not matter to the system whether it can distinguish features of its environment or 
not, and therefore there is no capacity for making distinctions yet. It is the formation of a 
feedback link between DNA and environment that is needed in addition to the DNA-
record (Ibid.). The surface, in other words, must turn into an interface linking the interior 
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to the exterior. Therefore, the final step consists in membrane becoming a real interface 
thanks to the establishing of feed-back loop between the system’s self-reference and the 
other-reference (Hoffmeyer 2008a). Hoffmeyer formulates the following transformations 
this way: 
Only then does the system’s understanding of its environment matter to the system […] relevant 
parts of the environment become internalized as an ‘inside exterior’, a phenomenal world or 
perceptual model which was called the Umwelt […] and in the same time the interior becomes 
externalized as an ‘outside interior’ in the form of ‘the semiotic niche’, i.e., the diffuse segment 
of the semiosphere that the lineage has learned to master in order to control organismal survival 
in the semiosphere. (Hoffmeyer 1998b:42) 
Thereby, this five-step model of a prebiotic evolution might contribute to making 
up an integrated account of how the self may be conceptualized in biosemiotics:  
 biosemiotics singles out the inside-outside asymmetry as basic for semiosis and the 
semiotic bridge that joints them; 
 this asymmetry implies the interdependence between self-reference and other-
reference that is indicative of the future-directedness of living system, or in other 
words, the availability of a self-sustaining project of the living system; 
 these features constitute the true agency which becomes the main attribute of life in 
biosemiotics and the basis of ascribing self to the living systems; 
 a genuine selfhood consists then in the capacity of any living unit to be the agentive 
self-sustaining system; 
 finally, the agency can be further specified as a controlled selective activity with the 
self-reflexivity and future-directedness being necessary conditions of it, as well as a 
self-sustaining project being the goal of any semiotic activity; an agentive unit (or an 
agent) acts in a constant semiotic interaction with other agents. 
At this point, there appears a link to a human self, which is treated as a specific 
instantiation of an evolutionary developing self of other living systems. The whole set of 
issues implied by the surface principle is relevant to the problematic of a human self in 
the first place. What is of considerable importance here is that, as a particular 
manifestation of a semiotic interface, the skin delimits us from the outside world and 
defends against its damaging forces. This is quite close to a philosophical reflection upon 
it: both claim that if we are to point to a “place” of the self it should be the skin. Although 
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in a postclassical philosophy when the skin is addressed as having a primary relevance 
for the formation or existence of a human self what is emphasized here is its 
individualizing and defending capacity. In this case, the skin is contrasted to the flesh as 
anonymous bodily basis common for all units of phenomenal world (Gritsanov 2011). 
And yet, what is further accentuated in biosemiotics is a creative and meaning-generating 
aspect of the skin when it is regarded as an indispensable part of the self. Therefore, it is 
not only a sort of a topological boundary, but, on the other hand, the skin in its semiotic 
capacity opens up the world to us by being “[…] a highly specialized manifestation of the 
very same interior interface principle whereby life processes are most generally built up” 
(Hoffmeyer 2008a:27).  
 
1.5. ‘Self’, ‘subjectivity’ and ‘subject’: the legacy of a classical 
philosophical discourse 
The extension of ‘subjectivity’ to the domain of all living systems, which is peculiar to 
biosemiotics, can be contrasted with a posthumanist attempt to bridge an ontological gap 
between the human and animal by way of transforming the concept of subject in what 
concerns the sphere of its application. This step is especially evident in Cary Wolfe’s 
attempt to establish a specifically posthumanist view (in that it refuses humanists’ way of 
defining subjectivity) of posthumanism (in that it challenges an ontological and ethical 
bridge between humans and animals), or simply, to ground a view on animal as a 
nonhuman subject which must be treated properly. Although the posthumanist 
perspective on the animal takes upon itself a task of treating it as a direct moral subject, 
it is an argument supporting the extension of the term on the animal world that is of 
interest here.  
According to Wolfe, even in state-of-the-art cognitive sciences the issue of the 
animal is addressed in terms of capacities for either thought or language, which 
determines its understanding of other issues concerning the animal’s power or capability. 
Further, an ontological divide established between animals and humans is based on a 
conclusion that subjectivity is directly dependent on the attribution of language. 
Therefore, the main strategy of bridging this gap consists in thinking of man and the 
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animal in terms of inabilities and passivity, of what they are not capable of. And here an 
issue of the embodiment comes to the forefront as it is a common feature shared by them: 
“What is fundamental to the ethical standing of both humans and nonhumans  […] is […] 
the embodiment and finitude of creatures of whatever species who may be deemed, to use 
Tom Regan’s term, ‘the subject of a life’” (Wolfe 2010: 66). 
Against this background, a biosemiotic extension of subjectivity on living systems 
is based on thinking of them exactly in terms of ‘abilities’, specifically, in terms of a 
semiotic competence and the capability of making sense of their surroundings. To put it 
another way, biosemiotics dismantles the tradition of considering the difference between 
the human and nonhuman in terms of the human’s abilities and power inasmuch as those 
abilities and power should be regarded as special instances of a more general biosemiosis 
unfolding in the biosphere: 
[…] humanity’s cognitive and emotional characteristics cannot be considered so miraculously 
great that we can justify setting humans ‘inside parentheses’ in the study of natural phenomena 
of this earth. The mental system of humans has grown from nature through an evolutionary 
process, and we must expect to find phenomena in nature that remind us of humanity in all its 
forms. (Hoffmeyer 2008a: 6) 
Further, the application of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘subject’ within the scope of 
biosemiotics can be legitimated on the basis of its comprising a linguistic framework in 
terms of R. Carnap, that is, the language of description coupled with a particular ontology 
(Carnap 1950). However, it is also legitimate inasmuch as it avoids pitfalls of the concepts 
of subject caused by its polysemy. Therefore, the task of this section is to show how 
biosemiotics copes with the implications of introducing a polysemous concept of subject 
into its discourse and avoids a metaphysical connotation of the term. 
According to Etienne Balibar, Barbara Cassin, and Andre de Libera, the meaning 
of the concept “subject” can be divided into three groups:  
 the subjectness, which unites the meaning of logical subject (“what” that a predicate 
is spoken about) and physical subject (“what” that accidents exist in);  
 subjectivity, which is emphasized in the opposition between subject and object, 
particularly, when it is necessary to discriminate the realm of mental from that of 
physical;  
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 subordination or submissiveness.  
The multiplicity of meanings of “subject” has been brought by a double Latin 
etymology, that is, on the basis of a neutral noun subjectum (which has been used along 
with the term suppositum as a translation of Aristotle’s υποκειμενον ever since the 
Scholasticism) and a masculine noun subjectus. From the first word a line of logic, 
grammar, and ontological meanings has derived, whereas from the second that of legal, 
political, and theological meanings has sprung (Balibar et al. 2009). Introducing the 
concept of subject in a philosophical discourse has triggered the formation of two separate 
paradigms of interpreting “subject”. Within the first framework, the accentuation of 
logical-grammatical and ontological-transcendental connotations of the term has led to 
endowing the term with a status of substance (what was supposedly done in the 
nineteenth-century German idealism). Within the second paradigm, political and legal 
connotations of the concept have been emphasized in the studies of a subject of 
subordination (Balibar et al. 2009). The second paradigm has a particular meaning for 
any attempt to ascribe a status of moral subject to the animal; however, provided that it is 
not the topic the given work, this paradigm can be left aside.   
What should be taken into considerations here is that the first paradigm of 
interpretation of subject, which draws upon the idea of subjectness and ascribes a status 
of substance to the subject, claims that subjectivity has something to do with the causality 
different from cause-effects relationships. Specifically, the tendency to substantialise the 
subject, revealed by German idealism of the first part of the nineteenth century, was 
congruent with a treatment of cognition from the point of view of a goal-setting activity, 
or to put it in another way, with the understanding of thinking as a spontaneous creativity 
in its relation to things with their own lawfulness. The ontological-transcendental 
connotations of the term have come to the forefront in the attempt, undertaken by J. G. 
Fichte and F. W. J. Schelling, to unite theoretical and practical philosophy and, thereby, 
extend a principle of practical reason, that is, the autonomy, as it was defined by Kant, to 
the domain of cognition (Fichte 1982; Schelling 1978). The autonomy was understood by 
Kant as the subject’s independence from a radical otherness that would impose its own 
laws on it (Kant 1996). Therefore, the autonomy supposed the causality immanent to the 
subject and was opposed to the cause-effect relationship peculiar to the natural world, 
which formerly had been thought to dominate in the domain of cognition.  
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This point in thinking about applicability of the term ‘subject’ outside a 
conventional domain of its use is of considerable importance inasmuch as biosemiotics 
stresses the limitation or even the inadequacy of mechanistic causality in the explanation 
of life. This potentially opens up a possibility of imposing a metaphysical connotation of 
‘subject’ as an ontologically distinct entity staying apart and above the stream of 
consciousness. It is important to stress again that biosemiotics supposes “the inclusion of 
a controlled notion of ‘subject’ in biology […]” (Emmeche et al. 2002: 18).  
Therefore, inclusion of an uncontrolled notion of ‘subject’ might lead to endowing 
‘self’ with an additional meaning of an ontologically distinct being, detached from or 
staying over and above the rest of the world. However, the shift of semiotic threshold and 
the attribution of agency to living systems, which are paradigmatic of biosemiotics, do 
not lead to positing self as an ontologically distinct entity staying apart from processes of 
life, or semiotic activity, as well as a pure principle of unity. Instead, the self is understood 
here as a result of semiotic processes, specifically, as arising “from the modelling based 
on different codes available in the living organism” (Maran 2011: 40). And this is 
characteristic not only of a current state of affairs in biosemiotics, but also to the works 
of the precursors of biosemiotics.  
Thus, the theory of umwelt, elaborated by Jakob von Uexküll, which extended the 
term ‘subjectivity” and offered the prerequisites for a biosemiotic perspective on self, 
shows the capability of avoiding the imposition of the metaphysical connotations of 
‘subject’ as well. Although it introduces the organism as a self-enclosed entity in a plan 
of nature, the self is defined here only through the objects that the organism relates to. 
What should be questioned further is a treatment of the subject in Uexküllian works, 
specifically, whether the subject should be taken as a self-contained entity, substance, or 
it should be treated in a relational context. With respect to the connotations of the term it 
is its first two meanings that are of special interest here. Subjectivity as it is taken against 
the background of objectivity can be applied to the umwelt theory inasmuch as it is the 
perspective of the animal’s phenomenal world, implied in the attribution of subjectivity 
to it, and the difference between informative and uninformative worlds that are at stake 
in the works of Uexküll. Nevertheless, the situation with the connotation of subjectness 
is not as clear. Uexküll’s appellation to bodily organization of the animal, i.e, the claim 
that it is the amount and organization of receptor organs that determine how rich the 
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animal’s umwelt is, may create an impression of the animal being treated in the sense of 
subjectness as a self-contained entity. However, it is the idea of a contrapuntal correlation 
between meaning receiver (or subject) and meaning-carrier that prevents the concept of 
subject from being treated that way: “The organized body (Organismus) of the subject 
represents the meaning-utilizer or, at least, the meaning receiver. If these two factors are 
joined together by the same meaning, then they have been jointly composed by nature” 
(Uexküll 1982: 52). Moreover, even in those cases when Uexküll appeals to the animal’s 
body, he still ascribes a primary and formative role to the meaning; in other words, it is a 
meaningful relation that accounts for pairing the subject with the meaning-carrier: “[…] 
there can be no doubt that the meaning-program acts upon the form-shaping so that the 
meaning-utilizer faces the meaning-carrier, and vice versa” (Ibid. 49). Overall, in the 
scope of umwelt theory, the animal’s being the subject is crucial and yet relational quality. 
Besides, what is of great importance in Uexküll’s theory in view of biosemiotic 
perspective on self is the accentuation of a recurrent character of the functional cycle. It 
is characterised by the recurrence inasmuch as effector cues with respective performances 
lead to a new functional cycle being enacted. Therefore, the functional cycle allows for 
the meaning being assigned and pragmatically verified. This feature was taken by Sebeok 
as indicative of an autopoietic nature of interpretation on a biological level, where 
“autopoietic” means actively self-maintaining process operating on the products of its 
own operations (Sebeok 2001a: 126). The accent on an autopoietic nature of interpretation 
together with his locating the self on the level of the umwelt and the claim that “[…] the 
self is never interrupted, the self is continuous from conception to death” leads to a 
conclusion that the self has a character of process rather than that of a stable entity 
(Sebeok 1991: 192; 2001a: 124). This conclusion is also grounded by his considering the 
self as cognitive, where “[…] cognitive is meant to suggest unlimited semiosis […] with 
respect to a potentially infinite string or cluster of interpretants” (Sebeok 2001b: 132).   
On the other hand, Rothschild’s project of biosemiotics shows a similar tendency 
to avoid the imposition of a metaphysical connotation of substance, although in a different 
way. A derivative character of subjectivity, its emergence from the interaction of different 
modes of semiosis is at odds with the conception of subjectivity typical of a classical 
philosophical discourse and, thereby, avoids imposition of an additional metaphysical 
connotation into his project of biosemiotics. A similar strategy is seen in Hoffmeyer’s 
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claim that life or ‘subject-ness’  “[…] should fundamentally be seen as organized around 
the nested set of membranes or interfaces which we call organisms” (Hoffmeyer 
1998a:37).  The idea of ‘surfaces inside surfaces’ and that of life residing in a border-
crossing exchange of information might prevent an outwardly similar term ‘subject-ness’, 
coined by him, from alluding to ‘subjectness’ connotation of a classical concept of 
subject.   
Furthermore, biosemiotics pretends to address the issue of subjectivity 
scientifically, which is possibly by directing a primary attention to its counterpart or 
‘semiotic niche’. The concept of semiotic niche “makes the Umwelt concept easier to 
handle in an evolutionary perspective, since now one may pose the question of whether 
the Umwelt of a species is up to the challenges posed by the available semiotic niche 
conditions” (Hoffmeyer 2008a:185). The umwelt may serve to guide the animal’s activity 
in the semiotic niche: it is supposed to regulate its behaviour, and a good fit between the 
umwelt and semiotic niche is at stake in the evolutionary selection. Consequently, on a 
conceptual level, ‘semiotic niche’ emphasizes a regulating role of the umwelt, thereby 
increasing chances of biosemiotics to avoid a one-sided definition of self.  
To conclude, although biosemiotics has succeeded in avoiding the imposition of 
metaphysical connotations while introducing ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’ in its discourse, 
it is questionable whether its exploitation of ‘subject’ in particular is reasonable, in that it 
could totally get rid of any kind of anthropocentrism, and necessary, in that it can make 
do with the concept of self. What should be taken into account is that ‘subject’ is a clearly 
humanist idea – that of a substance in a classical treatment of the concept – and an idea 
of subordination whose subsequent interpretation has specified it as a specifically human 
attribute. Namely, the latter connotation of ‘subject’ has been developed in the framework 
of the twentieth-century French philosophy in its efforts to overcome classical (or 
humanist) models of subject. The subordination was interpreted as caused by language in 
general or by particular discourses. This interpretation, as well as that peculiar to a 
humanist view of man, has rendered subject a specifically human attribute. Therefore, in 
general, the expansion of the concept of subject, whatever a common ground of human 
and non-human living beings may be, to the realm of animals is somehow problematic 
since ‘subject’ already presupposes some legal standing of its bearer. Overall, while 
‘subjectivity’ taken as an idiosyncratic perspective of phenomenal life should still be 
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preserved, biosemiotics should withdraw from the application of ‘subject’. It would be 
all the more reasonable to do so since biosemiotics has elaborated its own concept of self, 
which can pick up all attributes featured by ‘subject’ as used in its framework.  
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Chapter 2. Mode of possessing: bodily self 
2.1. ‘Collective self’ 
 
This chapter offers an examination of several biosemiotic theories that handle the concept 
of self from the perspective of sign processes of different levels that build and maintain 
it. Those conceptions stress such aspects of self as individuality and identity, bodily 
integrity or the unity of a multicellular organism, which all appear to proceed from the 
assumption that self is not given from the very beginning but achieved. To be more 
precise, they spring form the idea that the self is collective, which is a biosemiotic 
realization of a more general consideration that self is dialogical. This assumption focuses 
biosemiotic inquiries on a question of how coherency could be gained or how a collective 
self may be maintained.  
In the first approximation, those theories are based on the understanding of the 
body as a ‘web of semioses’, as Sebeok puts it (Sebeok 2001a). Biosemiotics regards 
meaning and signification as inherent to the body, which is taken not in a strict physical 
sense, but in a semiotic sense as “[…] a body that is inherently engaged in communicative 
processes that serve to coordinate the activities of cells, tissues and organs inside the body 
as well as to exchange integrating messages across hierarchically distinct levels” 
(Hoffmeyer 2012:113). When applied to humans, this perspective on the body leads to 
the interpretation of the mind or mental system as the interface that assures coupling of 
the organism to its environment (Ibid. 113). In the same vein, the human cognition 
appears to be a product of the semiotic emergence in multicellular organisms, which 
makes it a very sophisticated solution to the problem of the unity of multicellular life. 
Therefore, it cannot be considered a normative model of cognition in general; rather, it is 
an “[…] extraordinarily interesting – but obviously species-specific – development of the 
cognitive capacity that quite generally characterise all moving, living, adaptive semiotic 
systems” (Hoffmeyer 2008a:233).  
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The understanding of the body as a web of semioses fits in with a claim that there 
is no need to stipulate for a ‘central planner’ in order to account for a coherent working 
of units of semiosis on all integration levels of the organism – from the subcellular level 
to the level of coupling the organism with its environment. The need for an alternative to 
positing a central controlling agency underlies the attempts of biosemioticians to answer 
the question of how a massive-parallel working of cells, tissues and organs in the body is 
achieved; and they do so by offering bottom-up models of body-mind, of which the model 
of swarm organism, offered by Jesper Hoffmeyer, is highly representative. In this model 
the body is conceived of as the “infinite swarm of swarming swarms” (Hoffmeyer 
1996:126), where a swarm is defined as “a set of (mobile) agents which are liable to 
communicate directly or indirectly (by acting on their local environment) with each other, 
and which collectively carry out a distributed problem solving” (Hoffmeyer 1997:937). 
The smallest unit of this model, i.e. the cell, is thought to store historical information that 
allows it to perform effectively the task of interpretation at its own level. The body is then 
understood as a swarm of cells and tissues – or swarms of swarms – that stick relatively 
firmly together and are engaged in a massive-parallel problem solving based on 
idiosyncratic interaction patterns traced only with the reference to an individual history 
of the body (Ibid.). The affordance of a semiotic competence to decentralized units opens 
up the possibility for the intelligent behaviour to be induced without any central 
controlling agency (Hoffmeyer 1996: 125-126; 1997:939). 
In the model of swarm organism, the brain is functionally integrated in the body 
in virtue of interaction between swarms of nerve cells and swarms of immune cells 
(Hoffmeyer 1997). A joint effort by the nervous and immune systems and distributed 
information processing in the brain leads to rejecting the idea of a cognizing centre in 
favour of thoughts and feelings being treated not as localized entities, but as swarming 
out of the body collective (Hoffmeyer 1996:114). 
 
2.2. Semiotic individuality 
Thomas Sebeok introduces the concept ‘semiotic self’ by pointing to the existence of 
phenomena that cannot be determined by the action of language; rather, they are not 
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amenable to a verbal expression because of their lack of external referents and their 
resistance to unfolding into narratives. They can only be denominated. Among these 
phenomena, he mentions the establishment of self-images and their translation into 
performances, incorporation of a changing bodily side and other bodily parameters into 
daily activities, as well as all kinds of anomalous semiotic phenomena such as effects of 
wrongly parsed sign processes or their impairment, including long-lasting images of 
amputated extremities (Sebeok 2001a). For Sebeok, they indicate the presence of the 
‘semiotic self’.  
As a “recondite interpreter of our world in the semiotic chain of transmission”, 
‘semiotic self’ might be ascribed even to the cell, which would point to an active 
interpretative agency (Ibid. 126). Nevertheless, Sebeok is rather interested an a more or 
less comprehensive description of the semiotic self in animals and humans that would be 
the result of the work between three pattern-recognition systems, or networks of sign 
interpretations: the immune code, the genetic code and the neural code. Due to ‘the private 
character’ of signs and unlimited possibilities to generate interpretants, the self acquires 
characteristics of a semiotic individuality. On the other hand, Sebeok seeks to locate such 
self, which leads him to a suggestion that the semiotic self is not limited by an organism. 
The localization of semiotic self may serve as a point of departure in its 
description.  Sebeok locates it as follows:   
Clearly, in the organisms’ milieu extérieur, on the level of an idiosyncratic phenomenal world, 
tantamount to Jakob von Uexküll’s Umwelt (1973: 334-340) – [...] the ‘model’ of a species-
specific segment of individual reality – made up of exosemiotic processes of sign transmission 
[…] This semiotic self, which of course enfolds and thus ‘contains’ in its milieu intérieur some 
body’s immunocompetence, occupies, as it were, a sphere of space/time bounding the 
organism’s integument, although the programs for the fabrication of subjective constructs of this 
sort are surely stored within the subjacent realms of its endosemiotic organs […] This semiotic 
self, furthermore, is composed of a repertoire of signs of necessarily sequestered character […] 
(Sebeok 2001a:124) 
The localization of the ‘semiotic self’ on the level of umwelt apparently shifts the 
attention from the question of interpretative agency to the question of what contributes to 
the formation of the self (i.e. exosemiotic and endosemiotic sign processes) and what is 
indicative of it. In other words, Sebeok tries to provide a one-level account by seeing the 
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self as inherent in phenomenal life of the animal or the human. Besides, when applied to 
the context of humans, the ‘semiotic self’ presents self as pre-conceptual and is intended 
to be an elementary account of selfhood on which following accounts might be based.  
The self being “composed of a repertoire of signs of necessarily sequestered 
character” may point to an invariant dimension of the first-person givenness of experience 
(Ibid. 124). Similarly to the umwelt, the semiotic self exists in a way that cannot be 
grasped externalistically. Thus, following Uexküll, Geigges, and Hermann, we can 
reformulate the first-person perspective of phenomenal life in terms of each sign within 
the umwelt containing the ‘self’ of their receiver as a distinctive code (Uexküll et al. 
1993). Yet, at this point, it is still not clear if the semiotic self amounts to the first-person 
perspective of phenomenal life. However, it is important to stress here that, when applied 
to the human, the self being composed of the set of sequestered signs  “implies limits to 
which human self has the plasticity to become disembodied […]”, and thereby 
demonstrates its bodily character (Ibid. 134). 
Sebeok locates the self in the sphere of exosemiotic processes, although 
endosemiotic processes contributes to its formation as well. This makes him define it as 
“an amalgamated projection of composite non-verbal sign-assemblies called supersigns 
[…]”, implying, first of all, the immune and neural sign networks as ‘sign-assemblies’ 
(Sebeok 2001b:128). This leads again to the issue of location of the semiotic self, which 
apparently is neither a single organism nor is situated within its borders. To be more 
precise: 
The arena of the immune reaction (Ir) is contained within the skin. The arena in which the 
semiotic self officiates – and which contains the former – is  between an ill-defined region of the 
body beneath the skin of an organism and the outer perimeter of what I have labelled the ‘Hediger 
bubble’, discussed, and provisionally redefined thus: “a variably shaped impalpable sphere of 
personal space that admits no trespass by strangers and is defended when penetrated without 
permission”. (Sebeok 2001b:130-131)  
Thus the semiotic self occupies the ‘borderlands’ of an organism, although it is 
not bound to a bodily surface or skin alone because ‘Hediger bubble’ implicitly points to 
another border, i.e. a highly movable boundary of personal time/space, the invasion in 
which is accompanied by an emotional reaction of some sort. That is to say, organism and 
umwelt together form a unified system, which follows Hoffmeyer’s claim that the 
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asymmetry fundamental to the selfhood is not between the organism and its surroundings, 
but between the subjective universe or umwelt and its counterpart, the semiotic niche. 
This position of the semiotic self leads Sebeok to speak of the self as having a “double 
skin”: an “immunologic, or, biochemical, with semiotic overtones” and a “semiotic, or 
social, with biological anchoring” (Ibid.130).  
Yet, Sebeok also points to the genetic code contributing to the formation of ‘the 
supersign cognitive self’ provided that “[…] cognitive is meant here to suggest unlimited 
semiosis […] with respect to a potentially infinite string or cluster of interpretants” (Ibid. 
132). This stresses an aspect of a semiotic individuality. Furthermore, ‘cognitive self’ also 
implies the capability of the central nervous system to discriminate “the organism, or 
‘self’, within which it is lodged” from its umwelt or the perceived world. This 
discriminative capability evolves from a primal ontogenetic and phylogenetic sign 
relation that is the opposition between self and non-self (Ibid.132). 
Now it is possible to conclude that the semiotic self seems to comprise but does 
not amount to an invariant dimension of the first-person givenness of phenomenal life 
partially by virtue of a demarcation line that Sebeok draws between the self and 
consciousness: “One of the differences is that consciousness in interrupted by sleep, the 
self is never interrupted, the self is continuous from conception until death” (Sebeok 
1991:192). Being uninterrupted, the semiotic self is, thus, the very basis of identity, and 
in view of “a potentially infinite string or cluster of interpretants” it is primarily a semiotic 
individuality.   
 
2.3. ‘Built’ self 
The concept of semiotic self elaborated by Sebeok points to two domains of sign 
processes that contribute to its constitution and preservation, that is, exo- and 
endosemiotic processes. Overall, self officiates – as the subject felt, the dimension of the 
first-person perspective of phenomenal life or through the semiotic anomalies mentioned 
by Sebeok – on the exosemiotic level and, at the same time, it is constituted by the work 
of sign systems functioning on the endosemiotic level. Endosemiotic and exosemiotic 
processes are closely interconnected, which renders conditional a discrimination based 
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on the opposition ‘within the body’/ ‘between the body and the outside world’. Given 
that, Thure von Uexküll, Werner Geigges, and Jörg Hermann propose to distinguish them 
on the basis of their codes.  
Sebeok mentions the nervous and immune systems in his inquiry into 
endosemiotic processes, which may contribute to the formation and preservation of the 
semiotic self, although he does not elaborate this issue in details. Conversely, Uexküll, 
Geigges, and Hermann, on the one hand, and Hoffmeyer, on the other, dwell on the 
operation of the immune and nervous systems, thereby offering a more comprehensive 
account of an endosemiotic constitution of self.  
As long as the organism and the subjective universe (or umwelt) together form a 
unified system, it is not an individual body but the whole ‘unit of survival’, or the 
organism coupled with its universe that is to be investigated as hierarchically structured 
in integration levels. The self is thought to manifest on the exosemiotic level, or the level 
of umwelt, primary through the dimension of the first person perspective of phenomenal 
life, which, when applied to the context of humans, can also be taken as the unity of 
consciousness whereby sensations do not ‘float somewhere’ but are always enclosed in 
one and the same self. The distributed information processing in the brain or the working 
of separate and relatively independent mental systems seems to contradict the idea of the 
unity of consciousness. Moreover, those discoveries have become the basis of the so-
called ‘non-self’ theories in philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences, which hold that 
self is a mere illusion since there is no ‘center’ in the brain that could account for our 
sense of self. However, the biosemiotic approach to the self does not adhere to the idea 
that self is an entity, and rather than dooming it to be illusionary because of the 
impossibility to localize it within the brain, it argues for the self as resulting from the 
series of processes whereby the organism preserves its integrity and copes with its 
environment. Thus, the unity of consciousness is seen as a function of the body’s own 
historical oneness, implying ‘history’ both the information handed from past generations 
as well as the one gained ontogenetically. In other words, what is crucial here is that all 
brain modules work together and interact within one and the same body, or as Hoffmeyer 
writes:  
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What happens is this: during every second of human life, the body is effecting an interpretation 
of its situation vis-à-vis the biographically rooted narrative which the individual sees him- or 
herself as being involved in at that moment. This interpretation is what we experience as 
consciousness. (Hoffmeyer 1996: 119-120) 
Consciousness is seen here as the “body’s governor within the brain” which leads 
to questioning an evolutionary meaning of the phenomenal reality. For Uexküll, Geigges, 
and Hermann, the meaning of the umwelt resides in its providing animals with the means 
of orienting and actively coping with their environments, that is, the means of orienting 
the motor activity. Hoffmeyer approaches this question in a similar way, particularly: the 
experiential reality is a model allowing the organism to handle a bulk of incoming 
information and incorporate it into its performances. The quality of such reality evolves 
with the development of the nervous system (and the brain in particular) and is co-
extensive with the increase in the information, which is triggered by fast changes of 
spatial configuration during movements and which needs processing as to enable the 
animal to make proximal decisions, which might not be based on a genetic anticipation 
(Hoffmeyer 2008a: 206). Thus, the incremental refinement of the experiential reality fits 
in with the growth of semiotic freedom, which, as already mentioned, may be seen as one 
of the survival strategies in the evolution essential to free-moving species. 
This becomes the basis for the ‘holistic markers hypothesis’ put forward by 
Hoffmeyer: “We shall suggest that experiences quite generally serve as holistic markers, 
causing the brain machinery to focus its (our) attention upon one single truck in the spatio-
temporal continuity” (Ibid. 179). To specify, the holistic control is required as to focus 
brain processes according to the organism’s changing needs and intentions by means of 
creating “an approximated isomorph or analogue virtual reality, a single dominating 
‘lead track’ […]” (Ibid. 180). This means that it is not a direct control of processing of a 
limitless and multiple input delivered to the brain. Rather, it establishes “an overarching 
directional perspective” (Ibid. 181).  
Thus, “the experience is at each moment the superior, immediate, and 
unconventional interpretant in the ongoing biosemiosis [exo- and endosemiosis] of the 
organism” (Ibid. 181). There is an indirect connection between endosemiotic sign 
processes and the phenomenal world of the animal. For example, the immune system 
contains a minute list of substances in the environment that can cause harm to an 
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organism. On the other hand, the central nervous system contains programs for 
construction of the umwelt, which contain all the details necessary for orientation of the 
motor activity (Uexküll et al. 1993: 5). This suggests that both systems produce their own 
models of the organism’s umwelt, the specificity of which hinges on the coding peculiar 
to them. Uexküll, Geigges, and Hermann retain the notions ‘counterworld’ or ‘inner 
world’ (Gegenwelt and Innenwelt) coined by Jakob von Uexküll for those programs for 
the umwelt construction: 
We would like to reserve the term ‘counterworld’ for organic system like nervous system and 
the immune system which, independent of other organic systems, store ‘world program’ of their 
own. When these ‘counterworlds’, by means of circular sign relations between nervous system 
and immune system, intertwine and from a unity on the higher integration level of the organism, 
we speak of ‘inner worlds’. (Uexküll et al. 1993: 6) 
Particularly, those ‘counterworlds’ comprise samples of the sectors of the 
environment that are essential to the survival project of the animal; those samples are 
encoded in signs exchanged between cells and organs. The counterworlds of the immune 
and nervous systems merge to form a common ‘inner world’ of the organism. 
Exosemiotic sign processes translate surroundings of animals or humans, through 
zoosemiotic or anthroposemiotic sign systems, into the umwelt. However, in order to do 
this, a collateral work of exosemiotic and endosemiotic sign processes is required. The 
umwelt, therefore, performs not only a connecting role, but also a protecting one 
inasmuch as it supposes translation of endosemiotic signs pertaining to the ‘inner world’ 
into signs of exosemiotic sign systems, i.e., anthropo- or zoosemiotic (Uexküll et al. 1993: 
6).  
What should be taken into account here is that our body, as it is experienced, needs 
sign processes that already pertain to the level of the organism’s integration into its 
environment, or how Uexküll, Geigges, and Hermann formulate it, “a psychological 
integration level” (Ibid. 9). Moreover, in animals and humans “[…] sign processes on the 
psychological and the social integration level influence the order of endosemiotic sing 
processes, and vice versa” (Ibid. 9). Particularly, they propose the following bottom-up 
reconstruction of processes that build up and maintain the bodily self: the interaction of 
the cytosemiosis of numerous single nerve cells and attuning of their codes to each other 
leads to emergence of a complex code of an organ; apparently, the organ belongs to a new 
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level of integration, on which it responds to signs received and encoded by its individuals. 
A more complex level of the integration –  coupling of the organism with its environment 
– consists in the resultant being “translated into the psychological sign of a vital body 
sense” (Ibid. 33).  
The ‘counterworld’ created by the central nervous systems deserves a special 
attention: “Its sign processes as a whole are an endosemiotic mirror, so to speak, of the 
exosemiotic Umwelt or subjective universe (but not of the environment – i.e., the outside 
world)” (Ibid. 33). Being joined by the locomotor apparatus, the ‘inner mirror of the 
world’ it generates is, as it were, inserted between the sense organs taking in stimuli from 
the outside and the motor parts of the nervous system. This leaves its mark on the 
programs of the umwelt construction it stores:  
[…] in this phenomenal universe, the objects of the environment are represented by schemata 
which are not, as in a mirror, products of the environment, but rather ‘tools of the brain’ ready 
to come into operation if the appropriate stimuli are present in the outside world. In these 
schemata, sensory and motor processes are combined […] to form complex programs controlling 
the meaning-utilizing (bedeutungsverwertend) behavioural responses. (Uexküll et al. 1993: 34) 
The sensorimotor schemata, which comprise the neuronal ‘counterworld’, are 
continually shaped and changed by a ceaseless flow of the sensory data delivered to the 
brain. In this sensory input, the data that belong to proprioceptive or kinaesthetic senses 
are of particular importance because of a primitive or elementary bodily self-awareness 
they trigger: “At each moment they convey to the ‘I’ not only the exact position of all 
limbs, but also that it actually does possess a body” (Ibid. 42). Overall, continually 
reshaped schemata, which result from proprioceptive sign processes in the brain, 
comprise a ‘neural counterbody’ forming the centre of a ‘neuronal counterworld’. Both 
are in the state of a constant flux. ‘Counterbody’ and ‘counterworld’ form a unity “[…] 
because all the events we perceive in the environment are counteraffordances – that is, 
they are related to actual or potential affordances of our motor system and combine with 
these to form the spatial grid by which we orient ourselves” (Ibid. 44). The ‘counterworld’ 
is translated into the umwelt, the world experienced as ‘reality’.  
In a similar vein, Hoffmeyer takes “[…] construction of sophisticated senso-
motoric systems coupled to a corresponding finely tuned regulation of a milieu interieur 
that could safeguard the stability necessary for reliable performance” as a key point in 
49 
 
building up and preservation of the bodily structure, or, as he puts it, in the integration of 
a ‘multicellular self’ in animals (Hoffmeyer 2008a: 225). He likewise pays special 
attention to the sensorimotor schemata comprising the ‘neuronal counterworld’ and 
considers the bodily integrity dependent on modelling of bodily dynamics, which leads 
him to a conclusion that “the deepest sources for the cognizing self lay inscribed in the 
very basic senso-motoric unity of animal multicellular life” (Ibid. 233). In moving 
animals, the sensorimotor integration has been the main topic in evolution: the modelling 
of bodily dynamics has apparent evolutionary advantages because the activation of 
particular sensorimotor schemata ‘selected’ from the organism’s behavioural repertoire 
provides it with the possibility of fast reactions and orients it for the immediate actions. 
Thus, those schemata may be understood as results of coding the environment in terms of 
possible operations upon it, which liberates the animal from the necessity to process the 
incoming information in time-consuming ways as to perform accurately and effectively. 
Although the choice of which schemata is activated stays stochastic, it is informed 
philogenetically and ontogenetically. “It thus functions as a qualified guess that will be 
continually recalibrated by the actual incoming inputs from the proprioceptive senses for 
well-tuned accuracy and appropriateness” (Ibid. 233). This makes the schemata similar 
to what Uexküll, Geigges, and Hermann called ‘tools of the brain’ activated if the 
appropriate stimuli are present. Then mental processes may be seen as organized around 
a central series of ‘I can’s, which follows Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion that consciousness 
is primarily ‘I can’ rather than ‘I think that’ (Merleau-Ponty 1945), which also agrees 
with the predisposition of human brains to the narrative thinking. 
Further, the translation of a non-conscious ‘neural counterworld’ into a 
consciously experienced ‘reality’ might be influenced by an ‘immunological 
counterworld’, which is designed to fight harmful substances unapparent to our sense 
organs. The two ‘counterworlds’ are interwoven by sign connections to form a unified 
‘inner world”, although their participation in the formation of consciousness is quite 
different. Uexküll, Geigges, and Hermann put it as follows:  
In the counterworld of the nervous system, programs are stored for constructing a world which 
we consciously perceive and experience. This world includes our body, which is, as ‘experienced 
body’, its center; […] In contrast, the counterworld of the immune system contains programs for 
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confronting the environment in ways which elude our conscious experience. (Uexküll et al. 1993: 
35, 41) 
Overall, an experienced body turns out to be the translation of the ‘neural 
counterbody’. Yet, the body-sense also has a biological counterpart generated by the 
immune system, which may provide the earliest biological basis for our conscious self-
experience (Uexküll et al. 1993: 35, 42). Overall, the sense of self as it is conceptualized 
here presents the self as intrinsically bodily, which means that the disturbances of bodily 
schemata of any kind or errors in translation from ‘counterbody’ to the actual body-sense 
will affect the self in one way or another. Apparently, those conceptions also argue for a 
kind of primitive self-awareness, which is resultant from translating neuronal and immune 
‘counterbodies’ into signs of exosemiotic sign systems. Specifically, it is proprioceptive 
and kinaesthetic senses that from this bodily self-awareness.  
Additionally, the possibility to endow this bodily self with some emotional tone 
might be considered inasmuch as emotions play a role as important as that performed by 
the experience in assuring the survival of the animal. Hoffmeyer proposes to think of 
origins of experiential life as quite closely connected to the evolutionary origin of 
emotional life (Hoffmeyer 2014: 105).  
Emotions are spontaneous bodily reactions, which are unmediated by 
consciousness and accompanied by well-defined physiological patterns: “Through 
emotions are established characteristic functional states of the body, or rather, kinds of 
readiness that are connected to basic survival functions such as defence against dangers, 
reproduction, foraging, or aggression” (Hoffmeyer 2008a: 251). Therefore, emotions may 
be seen as bodily interpretants that immediately trigger subsequent interpretants in the 
form of particular kinds of behaviour. Given that, it is possible to consider them as a 
specific coding of the environment, which is representation of the outside world in terms 
of modifications it causes on the body. Feelings consist in experience of emotions, which 
thereby function as frame of their reference.  
To conclude, endosemiotic and exosemiotic sign processes generate the unity of 
the organism, which is a key point in the presented conceptions of self. Then, on the 
endosemiotic level, the self is concerned in connection with the bodily structure or 
integrity of a ‘multicellular self’ and can be considered with reference to the series of 
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events whereby the bodily integrity is maintained, which stress the self’s processual 
character. On the exosemiotic level (felt) self is specified through either the ‘body being 
experienced’ or the repertoire of ‘I can’s. 
 
2.4. ‘Minimal self’ 
There have been many controversies over the issue of self-consciousness that fits in with 
a broader tendency, which is the revival of interest in phenomenal consciousness 
characterising the state of affairs in analytic philosophy since the late 1980s. In this 
situation, the question of self has gained attention by virtue of the recognition that 
elucidation of the phenomenal consciousness requires self-awareness to be taken into 
consideration, as well as due to a common agreement over the existence of a constitutive 
link between experiential phenomena and the first-person perspective of experiential life. 
Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher express this connection this way: “Experiential episodes 
have, to use Searle’s terminology, a first-person ontology from the start, i.e. even before 
the subject acquires the conceptual and linguistic skills to classify them as his own” 
(Gallagher, Zahavi 2008:47).  
However, despite this agreement, the notion of ‘self-consciousness’ is rather 
ambiguous, which brings about numerous definitions that may compete with, contradict 
or supplement each other, likewise with the theories of self that hinge upon a particular 
understanding of self-consciousness. Among the approaches to self, which have been 
elaborated in the framework of philosophy of mind, the one called ‘minimal self’ is 
considered as promising the best exchanges of ideas between philosophy and cognitive 
sciences (Gallagher 2000:14). It pushes aside questions about the degree to which the self 
is extended beyond the short-term present to include past thoughts and actions, i.e. this 
approach limits the self to what is accessible to the immediate self-consciousness.  
One way to specify the concept of minimal self is through the problem of self-
reference involved in the usage of the first-person pronoun. This self-reference has a 
specific feature, which Sidney Shoemaker called “immunity to error through 
misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun”. The ‘immunity principle’ or IEM 
(Immunity to Error through Misidentification), as it is sometimes called, can be specified 
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as follows: while using the first-person pronoun ‘I’ to refer to herself, the speaker cannot 
commit a mistake about the person that she is referring to. Ultimately, this suggests that 
my access to my self is non-referential and direct, and the immediate self that is being 
referred to in the usage of ‘I’ is a pre-reflexive point where experience and actions 
originate (Shoemaker 1984).  
Nonetheless, in case of self-reference the speaker is apparently capable of 
linguistic communication. This might mean that one’s immediate and pre-reflective 
access to self already presupposes a conceptual mediation. Given that, some versions of 
minimal self seek for possibilities to talk about a non-conceptual access to self, that is, “a 
more primitive self-consciousness that does not depend on the use of a first-person 
pronoun” (Gallagher 2000:17). In other words, those versions of ‘minimal self’ hold that 
there is a yet more primitive sense of self than that involved in the usage of the first-
person pronoun. They are, therefore, based on the notion of pre-reflexive self-
consciousness, which is related to the idea, that experiences have a certain phenomenal 
quality of ‘what it is like’ to have them.  
The ‘minimal self’ is of special interest in the given work because there seem to 
exist some points of convergence between it and biosemiotics. Biosemiotics argue for a 
sort of primitive self-awareness, the biological and neurological basis for which is 
provided by the immune and nervous system and which is seen as proprioceptive 
awareness or the repertory of ‘I can’s. The ‘minimal self’ resorts to disciplines outside of 
philosophy in order to support its claims, which enables us to look at the biosemiotic 
approaches to the self under investigation and the particular arguments they use as 
possible frames of reference for the ‘minimal self’ and a source of ideas that may 
contribute to it.  
The versions of the ‘minimal self’, which stipulate for a primitive sense of self, 
may be divided into two groups: the first group draws on data from developmental 
psychology and contends that pre-reflexive self-awareness presents the self as embodied; 
the other version of ‘minimal self’ is put forward in the scope of recent trends in 
phenomenology and argues that the pre-reflexive self-awareness presents the self as 
bodily. Both approaches confront ‘non-self’ conceptions, which argue for an illusionary 
nature and the ‘theory-theory’ approach, which is similar, up to a point, to Peirce’s 
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concept of ‘fallible self’ and contends that the experience of self and of others is 
theoretical, inferential and quasiscientific in nature. Both ‘minimal selves’ have their 
advantages and disadvantages. It is in connection with these ‘minimal self’ theories that 
a biosemiotic approach to the self might contribute to current debates over pre-reflexive 
self-awareness in philosophy of mind. Particularly, it can help to overcome weak points 
and inconsistencies of both of them, which cast doubt on their reliability and ultimately 
get involved in the main arguments against them.  
However, the resort to biosemiotics in order to criticise and suggest possible ways 
of enhancing both versions of the ‘minimal self’ supposes the application of biosemiotic 
conceptions of self, which is not limited to a human self alone, to an exclusively human 
context, thereby posing the problem of anthropomorphizing the biosemiotic self. As a 
top-to-down perspective on the biosemiotic self may anthropomorphize the concept, a 
bottom-up perspective on the biosemiotic self may lead to a reductionist perspective on 
self with respect to the human. There always exists this danger in the choice of 
terminology. Thus, Balbieri rejects using the term ‘interpretation’ with respect to animals, 
while Hoffmeyer follows Pierce and applies the term whenever there is semiosis. Given 
that, we will follow the suggestion of looking at subjectivity, emotions, and phenomenal 
life – all of which are concerned in the biosemiotic concept of self – as more-or-less 
phenomena. This suggestion implies that there does not exists an unbridgeable 
ontological divide between animals and humans and the evolutionary dynamics of 
subjectivity and the experiential dimension of life may be taken as realization of the 
tendency of increase in semiotic freedom. With regard to this, Hoffmeyer writes:  
Let me suggest that semiosis, emotion, and experiential life is a graded series where semiosis is 
a fundamental characteristic of life as such – life without semiosis is unthinkable; emotions are 
somehow less fundamental property but most likely some preliminary kind of emotions must be 
at play in every multicellular organisms where a fast coordination of body parts is necessary in 
response to danger, or food, etc., since such coordination would presuppose a capacity for 
producing an instantaneously propagated ‘emotional’ wave throughout the body; genuine 
experiences, on the other hand, probably only occur in species possessing a central nervous 
system. The important point in the present context is that semiosis, emotion, and experiences are 
not thought to be essentially different categories, but rather to be a succession of more 
sophisticated elaborations of the same basic theme of teleodynamic existence. (Hoffmeyer 2014: 
106) 
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 This may justify up to a point the usage of the biosemiotic conceptions of self in 
the discussion of the ‘minimal self’ approach, in which the self that is dealt with is only 
human. Moreover, while analysing the ‘minimal self’ theories we will apply only 
particular arguments or ideas formulated with respect to them rather that the whole 
concept of biosemiotic self. 
We need to stipulate the terminology that will be used henceforth: ‘self-
consciousness’ and ‘self-awareness’ are taken as mutually substitutive terms. The first 
approach (let us call it the psychological ‘minimal self’) pursues the implications of 
studies of neonate imitation and argues that infants have a primitive sense of self or self-
awareness even before they acquire conceptual skills around the age of four and master 
the first-person pronoun. It, therefore, insists on acknowledgment of a non-conceptual 
and pre-linguistic self-consciousness. Another version of ‘minimal self’ (shall we call it 
phenomenological ‘minimal self’) argues for the existence of a primitive self-awareness 
that is an intrinsic feature of phenomenal consciousness in general and, therefore, it 
characterises it even before we direct our attention or reflect upon it. In this sense, it is a 
pre-reflexive self-awareness; however, inasmuch as we need conceptual skills to 
thematize our experience, it can also be specified as ‘non-conceptual’. Besides, this sense 
of self holds forth for the one stipulated for in psychological ‘minimal self’, therefore, 
‘non-conceptual’ and ‘pre-reflexive’ well be used interchangeably as well. Finally, 
‘minimal self’ refers to the approach itself, while the minimal self (without quotation 
marks) refers to the primitive sense of self or self-consciousness. 
Several versions of the ‘minimal self’ approach, which draw on data from 
developmental psychology, contend that pre-reflexive self-awareness presents the self as 
embodied and enactive within the environment. Thus, Jose Bermúdez argues that a proper 
understanding of self-consciousness cannot be reduced to the issue of linguistic self-
reference; rather, it should broaden its scope and recognize the existence of non-
conceptual and pre-linguistic forms of self-awareness that are “logically and 
ontogenetically more primitive than the higher firms of self-consciousness that are 
usually the focus of philosophical debates” (Bermúdez 1998:274). Ulric Neisser, Daniel 
N. Stern, and Philippe Rochat have also drawn similar conclusions. Unlike Piaget 
defending that initially the infant’s experience does not suppose any distinction between 
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self, world and others, they all contend that infants are in possession of self-experience 
from birth.   
Daniel N. Stern holds that, although language transform the infant’s experience of 
self, it does not constitute it. From the very birth, the infant has different pre-reflexive 
and pre-linguistic ‘senses of self’. Four types of self-experiences are available around the 
first three months of age:  
 self-agency, which is the sense of authorship of one’s own actions;  
 self-coherence, which is the sense of being an integrated and not a fragmented 
whole;  
 self-affectivity or the experience of subjective feelings; 
 self-history, that is, having the sense of endurance or continuity between present 
state and one’s own past (Stern 1985:71). 
Among them, the sense of self-agency or the authorship of one’s own actions 
deserves special attention. In order to understand what allows the infant to distinguish 
between her own actions or movements and those produced by others, Stern defines two 
experiential invariants: the sense of volition that foregoes a motor act, and the 
proprioceptive feedback or lack thereof during the act. Usually, what the infant faces are 
three different types of actions, namely: ‘self-willed action of self” (the experience of the 
action comprises both the sense of volition and the proprioceptive feedback), ‘self-willed 
action of other’ (none of the invariants are present), and, finally, ‘other-willed actions of 
self’ (the experience of volition is absent, but there is a proprioceptive feedback) (Stern 
1985:76).  
In keeping with Stern, Ulric Neisser and Philipp Rochat defend the view that self-
experience has an early developmental outset. Adopting Gibson’s notion of affordance, 
Neisser distinguishes five selves, that is: ecological, interpersonal, extended, private, and 
conceptual (Neisser 1988:35). The ecological self is the most basic and primitive among 
them and it consists of the individual’s self-experience as an active and embodied agent, 
enacted within the immediate environment. Whenever we perceive we are aware of 
ourselves since perception, for Neisser, involves the information about the relation 
between the perceiver and the environment: all perception involves co-perception of self. 
In addition, perception is, as it were, body-scaled, which means that the distance is not 
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measured in relation to one’s bodily dimensions and capabilities (Neisser 1993:8). For 
instance, a few-weeks-old infant can distinguish between objects that are within the reach 
and those that are beyond grasp. To be capable of this, the child should be aware of the 
location of objects in relation to herself. This makes Neisser to conclude, that although, 
at this stage, the infant does not have any explicit representation of herself, she is capable 
of perceiving a specific kind of affordance, i.e. she is in command with self-specifying 
information (Neisser 1993:4). 
Jose Bermúdez offers a very similar perspective on a primitive sense of self. He 
elaborates the concept of ‘non-conceptual first-person content’, which is close to 
Neisser’s ‘ecological self’. ‘Non-conceptual first-person content’ points to a minimal self 
consisting of information specifying one’s own embodied position in the environment 
(Bermúdez 1998). This information is pre-linguistic and non-conceptual, which leads to 
the conclusion that the infant is already equipped with the minimal self that is embodied 
and ecologically tuned. The existence of this non-conceptual self-awareness may be 
illustrated with the role it plays in neonate imitation. Neonates, less than one hour old, are 
capable of imitating the facial gestures of other people, which is not triggered by reflex 
or release mechanisms and involves the capacity to learn how to match the gestures 
presented to them (Gallagher 2000:17). To be capable of it, the infant must be able to do 
the following: 
 to discriminate between self and non-self’; 
 locate and use particular parts of her own body proprioceptively without seeing 
it; 
 recognize that the face she sees is of the same sort as her own because, as findings 
show, infants would not imitate non-human objects. 
To interpret those findings meaningfully we need to acknowledge the minimal self 
(Gallagher 2000:17). Following this, Bermúdez specifies a minimal form of self-
consciousness as involving, first, primitive proprioceptive sense of one’s body; second, 
the capacity to differentiate between self and non-self; finally, the recognition that the 
other is of the same sort as oneself.  By him, minimal self may be involved in monitoring 
of one’s own action in a way that allows her to know what she is doing without having to 
reflect on it. Furthermore, minimal self plays an essential role in intersubjective 
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interaction with others, specifically, proprioceptive-kinaesthetic aspects of non-
conceptual self-awareness are involved in and may be activated by our perception of 
others (Bermúdez 1995).  
Finally, based on the observed ability of the neonate to distinguish specify self 
and non-self stimulation, Philipp Rochat claims that infants are able to develop an early 
sense of self (Rochat 2001). They possess the proprioceptive information from the birth 
onwards, and proprioception is “the modality of the self par excellence” (Rochat 
2001:35). In other words, long before the mastery of first-person pronoun, even before 
she becomes able to pass the mirror-recognition step, the infant has a sense of her own 
body as organized and environmentally embedded entity and, hence, an early 
perceptually-based sense of self. Similarly to Neisser and Bermúdez, he considers this 
self to be the infant’s ecological self. Moreover, infants have a predisposition to explore 
their own bodies, which makes Rochat think that it is through those investigations that 
they specify themselves as differentiated agents in the environment, and ultimately 
developing an explicit awareness of themselves. This becomes the basis of the child’s 
ability, which is developed over time, to recognize her reflection in the mirror and, 
thereby, to adopt a detached perspective on herself, which marks the increasing capability 
to assume the perspective of others on herself.  
Overall, the psychological ‘minimal self’ emphasizes self-ownership, taken as the 
sense that it is my body that is moving or being moved, or, in a more general way, that it 
is I who is undergoing the experience, in their description of primitive self-awareness. 
Moreover, some of them include the sense of agency, which may be specified as “the 
sense that I am the one who is causing or generating an action” (Gallagher 2000:15). 
Finally, they contend that this non-conceptual self-awareness presents the self as 
embodied, embedded within the immediate environment and ecologically tuned.  
A phenomenological ‘minimal self’ will be dealt with here as it is presented in 
works of philosophers such as Shaun Gallagher, Dan Zahavi, Aaron Henry, and Evan 
Thompson. Phenomenological ‘minimal self’ insists that we have an innate and non-
inferential access to our experiential life. It is possible and justified to speak about a 
primitive type of self-experience whenever we are phenomenally conscious (Zahavi 
2005:197). Phenomenology, thus, offers a one-level account of self-awareness by 
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considering a minimal form of self-consciousness be a constant structural feature of 
conscious experience. Experience happens for an experiencing subject in an immediate 
way and it is marked as my experience. This immediate and first-person givenness of 
experiential phenomena has to be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflexive self-
consciousness. ‘Pre-reflexive’ is meant to accentuate here that it does not involves any 
additional higher-order mental state, which is somehow directed explicitly towards the 
experience at issue. Conversely, the self-consciousness should be taken as an intrinsic 
feature of phenomenal consciousness. In addition, it is not brought about in thematic, 
attentive or voluntary ways; rather, self-awareness is tacit, genuinely non-observational, 
in that it is not a sort of introspective observation of myself, and non-objectifying, that is, 
“it does not turn my experience into a perceived or observed object” (Gallagher et al. 
2008:46). Apparently, I can reflect on or attend to my experience, but prior to this 
reflection, I was not ‘self-blind’; rather “the experience was already present to me, it was 
already something for me, and in that sense it counts as being pre-reflexively conscious” 
(Gallagher et al. 2008:46).   
However, it should be stressed that there is a clear difference between having a 
first-person perspective of phenomenal life (‘weak’ first-person perspective) and being 
able to articulate it verbally (‘strong’ first-person perspective). A weak first-person 
perspective is just a matter of subjective manifestation of one’s experiential life, whereas 
a strong first-person perspective supposes mastering the first-person pronoun and 
adoption of a perspective of others on oneself. Gallagher and Zahavi insist on the 
significance of the weak perspective as a most basic form of self-awareness that precedes 
the usage of first-person pronoun (Gallagher et al. 2008:46). This weak self-awareness, 
in other words, does not exists apart from the ordinary conscious perception, thoughts or 
feelings, as a sort of an additional mental act; it is not triggered by reflection or 
introspection. 
The pre-reflective self-consciousness delivers an implicit sense of self at an 
experiential or phenomenal level. It is treated by Zahavi as a mode of existence where 
self reveals not as a separate entity standing either at the basis or over the stream of 
consciousness; rather, self appears inextricable from it and consists in its characteristic 
feature of being an experience from the first-person, “mine” perspective. Thus, Zahavi 
defines minimal self as “a ubiquitous dimension of first-personal self-givenness in the 
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multitude of changing experiences” (Zahavi 2005:325). In his opinion, there is no pure 
experience-independent self because the self “is the very subjectivity of experience and 
not something that exists independently of the experiential flow” (Zahavi 2005:325).  
To be pre-reflexively self-aware does not involve the interruption of “the 
experiential interaction with the world in order to turn the gaze inward”. Conversely, this 
self-awareness presents the self as world-immersed self and bodily, or the self is present 
to itself only when it is worldly engaged (Zahavi 2005:125-126). This also means that 
pre-reflexive self-awareness amounts to bodily-awareness. Kinaesthetic activation during 
perception produces an implicit and pervasive reference to one’s own body; therefore, 
pre-reflexive self-awareness of actual and possible movements of the body frames the 
experience that an individual has of the world. In other words, she experiences the world 
bodily: the body attains self-awareness in actions, in inclination to actions when it relates 
to something (Gallagher et al.2008).  
Understandably enough, according to the phenomenological minimal self, there is 
no self when we are non-conscious. However, this does not threaten the diachronic unity 
of self insofar as the identity of self is defined in terms of givenness and not in terms of 
temporal continuity. As Zahavi puts it: “Whether two temporally distinct experiences are 
mine or not depends on whether they are characterized by the same first-personal 
givenness, it is not the question of whether they are part of an uninterrupted stream of 
consciousness” (Zahavi 2005: 327-327). The point is that experiences that share the same 
first-personal self-givenness are the same. 
However, it may be questioned to what extent the self as it is presented in pre-
reflexive self-consciousness is bodily. According to Henry and Thompson, an implicit 
sense of self amounts to ‘perspectival ownership’, which is connected with experiences 
or actions presenting themselves in a distinctive manner to the subject whose experiences 
and actions they are. Moreover, minimal self requires being a bodily subject, i.e. being 
pre-reflectively aware of oneself as a living body inasmuch as it is the body that allows 
for perspectival experience of the world. This means that bodily self-awareness supposes 
a basic distinction between one’s subjective body (self) and one’s phenomenal world 
(other) and, therefore, entails an experience of boundedness understood in a weak sense 
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as “experiential distinction between one’s bodily perspective and whatever is perceived 
from that perspective” (Henry et al. 2011:242).   
Nonetheless, phenomenological ‘minimal self’ acknowledges that subjectivity of 
experience may not suffice for selfhood, and yet it is a necessary condition for it. 
Therefore, any account of self that disregards the fundamental structure and features of 
our experiential life, holds Zahavi, is stillborn since it “provides the experiential 
grounding for any subsequent self-ascription, reflective appropriation, and thematic self-
identification” (Zahavi 2005:330).  
 
2.5. ‘Bounded’ self 
The psychological and phenomenological versions of ‘minimal self’ seem to be quite 
similar in that they both point to the role of proprioceptive and kinaesthetic senses in pre-
reflexive self-awareness. However, the main difference between them lies in their 
definition of minimal self as embodied or bodily. It is important that the 
phenomenological ‘minimal self’ has been elaborated partially in response to the 
psychological approach. According to the phenomenological ‘minimal self’, pre-reflexive 
self-awareness is bodily-awareness, and the latter presents the self as bodily. The 
psychological approach takes minimal self as ‘embodied’, which makes the definition of 
self too Cartesian implying that the self might be of a different nature than that of the 
body. In this direction goes the criticism of the psychological ‘minimal self’. 
Nevertheless, the phenomenological approach likewise cannot avoid some inconsistency 
and its account of primitive sense of self may appear uninformative regarding some 
particular issues.  
A weak point in the psychological ‘minimal self’ consists in that the position of 
its representatives with respect to body-awareness constituting genuine self-experience is 
not clear as it should be. Those theories suffer from certain inconsistency that ultimately 
leads to the sense of self being conceived of as a kind of object-awareness, which, in turn, 
discounts the possibility of a non-observational access to self. Thus, Rochat contends that 
there are three fundamentally different kinds of experience, i.e., experience of self, of 
object, and of other people. However, he does not seem to follow up with his distinction 
when he talks of the body as an object of the infant’s exploration and, especially, when 
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he thinks of self-perception as a matter of differentiating one’s own body from other 
objects in the surroundings (Rochat 2001: 37). Likewise, Stern seems to consider the 
infant’s self-experience derivative from that to distinguish herself from other, which is, 
in turn, an instantiation of her general ability to discriminate between different entities. 
He argues that the infant perceives and organizes multiple stimuli into different 
categories: she has innate abilities allowing her to discern inconsistent batteries of stimuli 
in a way that keeps self and other separate (Stern 1983). However, this does not elucidate 
how the infant senses that one of the experiential configurations is herself. Stern admits 
that the experience of proprioception and volition are highly important here, and yet he 
takes the infant’s self-experience as the question of accurate discrimination between two 
different objects. Similarly, Neisser considers the ecological self to be an object of 
perception (Neisser 1988:56). Therefore, self-awareness appears to tantamount to object-
awareness. However, self-awareness cannot be identified with object-awareness without 
posing some problematic issues because, as Zahavi puts it: 
For something to be given as an object is for it to be given as something that transcends 
the merely subjective. For something to be given as an object of experience is for it to 
differ from the subjective experience itself. However, if it is so, if object-awareness 
always involves a kind of epistemic divide, a distinction between the subject and the 
object of experience, it cannot help us understand self-experience (Zahavi 2005:203). 
Besides, seeing the primitive sense of self as resultant from self-recognition based 
on distinction between different objects disregards the idea that the most fundamental and 
primitive self-experience should be non-observational and non-inferential. For 
Shoemaker, to recognize some object as myself, I need to know something true of the 
object that I already know to be true of myself. There is no choice but to acknowledge the 
existence of non-objectifying self-awareness, if we are to avoid an infinite regress. 
Shoemaker writes: “The reason one is not presented to oneself ‘as an object’ in self-
awareness is that self-awareness is not perceptual awareness, i.e., it is not a sort of 
awareness in which objects are presented. It is awareness of facts unmediated by 
awareness of objects” (Shoemaker 1984: 105). 
In response to this, the phenomenological ‘minimal self’ contends that “first-
personal experience presents me with an immediate, non-objectifying and non-
observational access to myself” (Zahavi 2005:204). It then insists on the need to consider 
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the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and self-experience in order to make 
a well-founded attribution of the latter. As a primitive self-awareness is involved in 
phenomenal consciousness, “[…] the question of self-awareness is not primarily a 
question of specific what, but of a unique how. It does not concern the specific content of 
an experience, but its unique mode of givenness”, that is, the dimension of mine-ness of 
experience (Zahavi 2005:204). This is the reason why phenomenologists claim that the 
infant can be self-aware in a non-inferential and non-objectifying way. 
Biosemiotics can help to overcome this inconsistency of psychological ‘minimal 
self’, the source of which may reside in confusing endosemiotic and exosemiotic 
processes of interpretation that constitute the self with the self as it appears or gets felt on 
the level of phenomenal reality. To begin with, the idea of self-specifying information 
seems to misguide the interpretation of minimal self, which finally makes Neisser identify 
the ecological self, i.e. the experience of oneself as an agent enactive within the 
environment, with the object of perception.  
The biosemiotic understanding of affordance, offered in the work of Uexküll, 
Geigges and Hermann, may be of some help here. A tetradic model of sign interpretation, 
that considers the whole action and active self, presents the affordance as part of an 
overall process and not as its result, which is ‘utilizing of meaning’ or actualizing the 
object. That is, affordance is not something perceived in addition to the object or as an 
‘inviting’ quality of it, but it participates in the very construction of the object. To specify, 
affordance is the effector’s response, the interaction of which with the environment’s 
counteraffordance ‘creates’ the object of perception. Affordance, thus, has something to 
do with sensorimotor schemata and, therefore, with endosemiotic sign processes. 
Therefore, ‘self’ is manifested in generation of affordances, which determine the 
formation of objects of perception. However, this is not the level of phenomenal 
consciousness, but the level of endo- and exosemiotic processes that underlie the 
phenomenal consciousness. This casts doubt on the idea defended by Neisser and 
Bermúdez that the infant’s self-awareness lies in perception of a distinct kind of 
affordances. What is implied in their notion of ecological self is quite similar to Sebeok’s 
concept of semiotic self. The semiotic self is accounted for incorporation of bodily 
parameters, which, of course, change over time, into daily performances. This implies the 
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collaborative working of exo- and endosemiotic sign processes, the result of which, on 
the level of phenomenal life, may be presented as either ‘I can’ or ‘I can’t’. 
Following this further, the fact that perception is body-scaled does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that perception of objects implies the perception of myself as a 
perspective-lending object. Rather, pre-reflective awareness of my body is registered as 
‘I can’ or ‘I can’t’. For, as Hoffmeyer points it, there is an inextricable connection 
between mental recognition and bodily senso-motoric activity, which is most evident on 
the level of our senses (Hoffmeyer 2008a:277).   
Besides, the representatives of psychological ‘minimal self’ claim that the 
acknowledgment of ecological self is motivated by the need to explain the very possibility 
of the neonate imitation. However, we may gain in understanding of the primitive sense 
of self if we invert this statement: the neonate imitation shows that the so-called self-
specifying information is acquired in the intersubjective interaction with others, that is, 
in bodily movements, therefore, it is the neonate imitation that might help in explaining 
the minimal self and not vice versa.   
Apparently, the infant gets involved into intersubjective interaction from the very 
birth, which is, as Gallagher writes, the very fact of our existence determined by a more 
primary ‘intercorporeal interaction’ taking place during a pre-natal period (Gallagher 
2011). For Meltzoff and Moore, there is “an intrinsic relatedness between the seen bodily 
acts of others and the internal states of oneself (the sensing and representation of one’s 
own movements)” (Meltzoff  et al. 1995:53-54). The infant might be capable of bridging 
a gap between the visual appearance of the other’s body and proprioceptive givenness of 
her own body thanks to her body having an outside and comprising an anticipation of the 
other. 
Therefore, the fact that proprioceptive-kinaesthetic aspects of the sense of self are 
involved in or activated by perception of others together with the fact that sense of self is 
acquired in active imitating movements puts the question of proprioceptive awareness to 
the forefront: the intersubjective interaction becomes a primary context of modelling 
bodily dynamics. It is partially in keeping with the inclusion of self-agency (Stern) and 
self-ownership (Rochat and Bermúdez) in the list of self-experiences. However, the non-
conceptual self-awareness should be understood not as derivative from differentiation 
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between objects or as based on some sort of inferential self-recognition; rather, it should 
be interpreted as a repertory of ‘I can’s’ and ‘I can’t’s. Pre-reflexive self-awareness, 
which is understood this way, presents the self as bodily, which blurs body-mind duality 
latently present in the psychological ‘minimal self’. 
Besides, self-experiences, as the data on neonate imitation show, are obtained in 
an emotional attuning to others, which means that they are tinted emotionally. As 
biosemiotics shows, evolutionary history of emotions is somehow co-extensive with that 
of experience. Moreover, as Hoffmeyer states, being the function of experience, holistic 
control “is an emotionally anchored focusing of our brain processes” (Hoffmeyer 
2008a:181). This justifies the inclusion of an emotional component into the minimal self. 
The repertory of ‘I can’ may be boosted emotionally since the imitating movements are 
triggered in response to actions of others. The accent on the emotional component of the 
sense of self will enable to consider a unique mode of givenness of the experience, i.e. 
‘how’ rather than ‘what’ and, thereby provide a non-objectifying approach to pre-
reflexive self-awareness. It is possible to make even a stronger claim that the sense of self 
is scaffolded emotionally in the intersubjective interaction. Here ‘scaffolding’ is taken in 
general sense as “an entity or process which supports another, primary process and thus 
enhances the stability, functioning, or space of possibilities of the latter […]” (Emmeche 
et al. 2002:29).  
A shortcoming of the phenomenological ‘minimal self’ consists in its claim that 
bodily-awareness presents the self as bounded in a weak sense. Henry and Thompson 
suggest preserving a weak sense of boundedness, which consists in “experiential 
distinction between one’s bodily perspective and whatever is perceived from that 
perspective”, while rejecting a strong boundedness (Henry & Thompson 2011:242). They 
elaborate the distinction between weak and strong boundedness in their critical response 
to the neo-Buddhism-inspired ‘non-self’ theory offered by Miri Albahari. For her, the 
subject’s awareness in not essentially bounded, in that the experience of boundedness can 
be dropped away. However, we tend to think of our subjectivity as being based on a self 
that is bounded and an ontologically distinct entity (Albahari 2006:72). In reality, self is 
just an emotional and cognitive construct, which arises as a result of some sort of 
emotional craving and is constituted by four modes of self-identification: ‘this-
importance-of-being-this-very-thing’, ‘agency’, ‘consistent self-concern’ and ‘personal 
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ownership’ (thinking of psychophysical attributes as belonging to the subject), each 
possessing some emotional value (Albahari 2006:107-109). In response to this, Henry 
and Thompson argues for self being an intrinsic feature of phenomenal consciousness and 
the need of weak boundedness in its definition inasmuch as it is a body that lends the 
perspective.   
However, weak boundedness may not suffice for the description of minimal self 
since it might easily be challenged by data on autism and body integrity identity disorders. 
The idea that bodily-awareness presents the self as bounded in a weak sense (as bodily 
perspective different from what is being perceived) also disregards the meaning of self-
ownership (sensing that it is I who is undergoing the experience) for the neonate imitation 
insofar as self-ownership requires bodily integrity inextricable from individuating and 
protecting function of bodily boundary.  
Based on the biosemiotic approach to the self, it is possible to suggest how the 
phenomenological ‘minimal self’ can be amended. Specifically, non-conceptual self-
awareness requires bodily-awareness, however, unlike proponents of phenomenological 
‘minimal self’, I suggest that such bodily-awareness needs to present the bodily-self as 
bounded in a strong sense. ‘Strong boundedness’ means not just the sense of bodily 
boundaries or the distinction between one’s body and the perceptual world, but also the 
self-ownership connected to it and its emotional significance. I proceed from the idea that 
the importance of a functional asymmetry between the inside and outside, which is 
essential to processes of life, must be reflected phenomenologically in pre-reflective self-
awareness as an emotional significance of bodily boundaries and overall bodily integrity. 
The boundary represented here by skin ‘mediates contact with the surrounding world via 
its manifold of surfaces, on the physical, biological, psychological, and social levels” 
(Hoffmeyer 2008a:213). 
As mentioned previously, the decision to exclude strong boundedness from 
bodily-awareness may be challenged by data on autism. Data on autism, especially on the 
inability to respond to others and unusual reactions to sensory stimuli, are most indicative 
of the need to include the strong boundedness in an informative account of bodily self-
awareness. For example, Temple Grandin’s description of panic attacks caused by her 
missing sense of stable bodily boundaries emphasizes an emotional significance imposed 
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on the self-world distinction supposed by the strong boundedness (Grandin 1995). The 
inclusion of strong boundedness allows defining the first-person perspective in terms of 
feeling one’s embeddedness into one’s environment and the sense of being protected, i.e. 
being a distinct and not a fragmented whole. Given that, it is an emotional response to 
derangement of self-ownership and instability of bodily boundaries that determines the 
sense of self in autistic persons. 
In the scope of biosemiotics, a functional meaning of boundary resides in its 
capability of individuation and protection against external intrusions, and in its giving the 
experience of belonging to the world (Hoffmeyer 2008a). Therefore, the instability of 
bodily boundary may have two emotional effects: experiencing the lack of embeddedness 
in phenomenal world, and being undelimited from the ‘outside’ and defenceless against 
its damaging forces. Both must have frustrating effects on the sense of self, be it self-
closure or threat to the self. Several pathologies, unified under the title of body integrity 
identity disorders, demonstrate a connection between derangement of bodily integrity and 
disorder of self-ownership, an emotional response to them, and their effects on the sense 
of self. The Guillan-Barré syndrome and somatophrenia may illuminate a role of 
boundary and self-ownership in self-understanding. In case of the former, ‘disappearance’ 
of bodily boundaries provokes intense feelings of being locked inside oneself and cut off 
from the physical world, experiencing one’s body as blurred and insubmissive to 
instructions, which is followed by the feeling of hopeless loneliness (Fyrand 1997:65). In 
case of the latter, somatophrenia, the request of patients to cut off, for instance, their left 
hand may be compelled by the feeling of an external intrusion. The emotional significance 
of bodily integrity and self-ownership may go unnoticed unless in extreme pathological 
cases, and yet it contributes to the primitive sense of self.  
For Uexküll, Geigges and Hermann, body integrity identity disorders may be seen 
as disturbances of the body schemata or as a translation error. They demonstrate that “[…] 
our living body, which we experience as the center of our reality, is the product of a 
‘neural counterbody’ which is continually shaped and reshaped by ceaseless flow of 
proprioceptive signs from the muscles, joints, tendons of our limbs to the brain” (Uexküll 
et al. 1993:43). If the formation of the ‘neural counterbody’ in the brain is disturbed, 
either because of a disrupted stream of proprioceptive signs from limbs or because the 
interaction of the respective cerebral system is blocked, “the translation into the 
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experience of a ‘real body’ in a ‘real world’ collapses” (Uexküll et al. 1993:44). Speaking 
differently, the disturbances of the body schemata of any kind or errors in translation from 
‘counterbody’ to actual body-sense must reveal themselves on the phenomenal level, 
thereby affecting bodily-awareness. Derangement of self-ownership triggering some 
emotional response, for example, anxiety, and threat to bodily integrity are exactly the 
cases when “translation into the experience of a ‘real body’ in a ‘real world’ collapses”. 
Therefore, they must affect the minimal self, which ultimately suggests that it should be 
conceived of as bounded in a strong sense.  
To conclude, the biosemiotic revision of psychological and phenomenological 
‘minimal selves’ suggests that any account of bodily-awareness is uninformative or weak 
with regard to neonate imitation and set of pathologies unless strong boundedness is 
included. In addition, it makes these versions of ‘minimal self’ complementary. 
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Conclusions 
 
The aim of the current work is achieved through the realization of five tasks. First, an 
outline of the prerequisites of a biosemiotic approach to the self as laid down in the works 
of the precursors of biosemiotics. It is shown that the umwelt theory lays the preconditions 
of an explicit concept of self by affording the status of subject to animals and suggesting 
a processual character of the self. Furthermore, speaking about the degrees of subjectivity 
and modes of semiosis that constitute it, Rothschild anticipates one of the theses of 
biosemiotics, according to which subjectivity should be treated as a ‘more-or-less 
phenomenon’.   
Further, ‘self’ and the related concepts ‘subjectivity’ and ‘subject’ are positioned 
in the conceptual framework of biosemiotics. It is demonstrated how those terms arise in 
the attempt to ground the new causality, which would differ from the mechanistic cause-
and-effect relationship. The causality that is immanent in the processes of life has been 
reasoned by way of, first, elaborating the concepts of semiotic freedom and semiotic 
causation, second, affording ‘agency’ to living systems. Biosemiotics treats agency as a 
real property of life residing in the capacity of organisms to interpret signs, or to produce 
end-directed behaviours. It is demonstrated that it is exactly the introduction of ‘agency’ 
in the elucidation of life that has paved the way for the application of ‘subject’ to all living 
beings. Particularly, in biosemiotics the status of subject might be ascribed to any living 
being insofar as it is a semiotic agent, and the ability of any living system to be agentive 
amounts to its being the self. In addition, it is stressed that the specificity of a biosemiotic 
interpretation of self is determined by the status of an integral aspect of life being granted 
to qualia and the formulation of a topological definition of self, which associates the issue 
of self with that of biological reference. 
In the last section of the first chapter, the extension of ‘subjectivity’ on all living 
systems, peculiar to biosemiotics, is contrasted with a posthumanist attempt to bridge an 
ontological gap between human and animal. In addition to this, the conditions of a 
69 
 
legitimate and grounded application of ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’ in biosemiotics are 
exposed. In the biosemiotic framework, the application of ‘self’, ‘subjectivity’, and 
‘subject’ is congruent with the search for a criterion distinguishing living system from 
non-living systems. However, it may be questionable whether this extension can avoid 
the imposition of a metaphysical connotation of ‘subjectness’ due to the concept of 
subject comprising an apparently humanist idea – that of a substance in a classical 
treatment of the concept – and the idea of subordination whose subsequent interpretation 
has been specified it as specifically human. Nonetheless, it is concluded that the shift of 
the semiotic threshold and the attribution of agency to living systems has not led to 
positing self as an ontologically distinct entity staying above and beyond processes of 
life, or semiotic activity, due to, first, the understanding of self as a result of semiotic 
processes, and second, accentuation of the first-person perspective of experiential life in 
the notion of subjectivity.  
In the second chapter, an analysis of particular biosemiotic conceptions of self is 
offered. It is stipulated that, in biosemiotics, the self is regarded as collective, which is a 
specific realization of a more general understanding of self as dialogic. The examination 
of the swarm organism model of the body-mind allows making a conclusion that the 
biosemiotic self may be regarded as resultant from the series of processes whereby the 
organism preserves its integrity and copes with its environment. The conceptions of self 
as semiotic individuality and ‘built’ self address the issue from the point of view of endo- 
and exosemiotic processes that contribute to preserving the unity of a multicellular 
organism: on the endosemiotic level, the self is concerned in connection with the series 
of events whereby the bodily integrity is secured; on the exosemiotic level self is specified 
through either the ‘body being experienced’ or the repertoire of ‘I can’s. 
Finally, two versions of ‘minimal self’ approach to the human self in philosophy 
of mind are analysed from a biosemiotic point of view. Particularly, the exposition of 
their drawbacks and suggestions of possible ways of their improvement are offered based 
on the arguments from the conceptions of the self that were surveyed. The main drawback 
of the psychological ‘minimal self’ resides in its treatment of self as embodied, which 
leads to a perspective on the pre-conceptual self-awareness that takes it as the object-
awareness, whereby the possibility of a non-objectifying and non-observational access to 
the self is dismissed.  On the other hand, the main shortcoming of the phenomenological 
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‘minimal self’ springs form its claim that the pre-reflexive self-awareness presents the 
self as bounded in a weak sense, which may be challenged by the data on autism and body 
integrity identity disorders. The drawback of the first version of the ‘minimal self’ may 
be overcome with the help of a biosemiotic interpretation of a primitive sense of self as a 
repertory of ‘I can’s’ and ‘I can’t’s; the second version of the same approach may be 
enhanced by grounding – from a biosemiotic viewpoint – the claim that body-awareness 
needs to present the bodily-self as bounded in a strong sense. 
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Resümee 
 
Biosemiootilised lähenemised minale 
Antud magistritöö eesmärk on ühtlustatud lähenemine biosemiootilisele “mina”-
käsitlusele ja selle käsitluse kaasamine vaimufilosoofilistesse aruteludesse “minimaalse 
mina” teemal. Selleks esitatakse töös ülevaade biosemiootilise “mina”-käsitluse eelloost, 
mis lähtub biosemiootika eelkäijate uurimustest. Seejärel paigutatakse töös “mina” ja 
sellele lähedased mõisted “subjektiivsus” ja “subjekt” biosemiootika kontseptuaalsesse 
raamistikku. Töös näidatakse, kuidas need mõisted kerkivad esile püüdlustest mõtestada 
uut kausaalsust, mis erineks mehhaanilisest kausaalsusest, ning mis oleks omane 
eluprotsessidele ja võimaldaks indiviidide agentsust. Lisaks rõhutatakse töös, et 
biosemiootilise “mina”-käsitluse eripära tagab kvaalide (fenomenoloogiliste omaduste) 
tähtsustamine ning topoloogilise “mina”-definitsiooni sõnastamine.  
Esimese peatüki viimases osas tuuakse välja biosemiootikale omane 
“subjektiivsuse” laiendamine kõigile elussüsteemidele kõrvutatuna posthumanistliku 
püüdega ületada ontoloogilist lõhet inimese ja looma vahel. Lisaks näidatakse töös 
“subjekti” ja “subjektiivsuse” biosemiootikas põhjendatud ja õigustatud rakendamiseks 
vajalikke tingimusi. Teises peatükis analüüsitakse erinevaid biosemiootilisi “mina”-
kontseptsioone. Tingmuseks seatakse, et biosemiootikas nähakse “mina” kollektiivsena, 
mis on spetsiifiline osa üldisemast arusaamast, mille järgi “mina” mõistetakse 
dialoogilisena. Sel juhul võib “mina” uurida protsesside näitel, mis seda määravad ja 
säilitavad, mille tulemuseks on “ehitatud” ja semiootilisel individuaalsusel põhinev 
“mina”-kontseptsioon. Viimaks analüüsitakse kahte erinevat vaimufilosoofiast tulenevat 
lähenemist “minimaalsele minale” biosemiootilisest vaatepunktist. Iseäranis tuuakse esile 
nende puudusi ning pakutakse lahendusi nende võimalikeks parandusteks ja 
edasiarendusteks mõnede biosemiootiliste “mina”-käsitluste argumentidest lähtuvalt.  
 
Võtmesõnad: biosemiootiline mina, minimaalne mina, agentsus, subjektiivsus, 
subjekt, subjektsus, Umwelt, kvaalia, semiootiline suhtlus
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